Iran's New Security Chief Sets Firm Conditions for Reopening Strait of Hormuz as Oman-Mediated Talks Advance
Iran's newly appointed Supreme National Security Council chief, Mohsen Rezaei, told China's ambassador to Tehran that the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until Washington ends its military campaign, lifts its naval blockade on Iranian ports, releases Iranian funds held abroad, and accepts a region-wide ceasefire encompassing Gaza and Lebanon. Rezaei's remarks, reported on August 12, crystallize the full set of Iranian demands for the first time from the SNSC's new leadership and narrow the diplomatic space for a near-term reopening of the waterway (Al Jazeera).
Rezaei stated plainly that the Strait "will not be reopened as long as the US does not change its behavior and accept Iran's conditions." The conditions he enumerated go well beyond the bilateral shipping arrangements that Oman has been mediating. They link Hormuz directly to the broader regional conflict architecture, folding the Gaza and Lebanon ceasefires into a demand set that Washington has shown little willingness to entertain as a package (Al Jazeera).
The conditions also include Iranian compensation claims. According to the Financial Times, Iran warned it will not reopen the Strait unless the US meets a series of conditions, including paying Tehran compensation (Financial Times). President Donald Trump dismissed the reparations demand outright, AP reported on August 10. Trump also told Real America's Voice that he was "sort of negotiating" with Iran and that "they're very devious negotiators" (Al Jazeera). Earlier in August, Trump had said a deal to announce the reopening of the Strait could come soon (AP News).
The gap between those two positions is the central dynamic. On one side, Iran has progressively expanded its demand set from the technical shipping framework negotiated with Oman to a comprehensive set of conflict-resolution preconditions. On the other, the US administration is treating the shipping channel as a discrete issue and rejecting any linkage to compensation or regional ceasefire demands.
Qatar Foreign Ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari said talks between Iran and Oman on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz had reached an advanced stage (Al Jazeera). Reuters reported on August 8 that Iran described the Oman deal as being in its "final stages," but reiterated that the waterway would only reopen once the United States met additional conditions (Reuters). Iran and Oman had made progress toward a deal in talks seen as a potential diplomatic breakthrough earlier in August (AP News). An IRGC spokesperson identified as Hossein said the Strait "will certainly be reopened whenever the United States accepts Iran's conditions" (Reuters).
Iran's state media apparatus has reinforced the message across multiple platforms. IRNA published an English-language report under the headline "Strait of Hormuz will stay closed until US changes course: Iran's top security official" (IRNA). Press TV ran a parallel report on August 9, followed by a News Review item on August 10 stating that reopening hinges on the US halting its aggression and compensating for its illegal measures (Press TV; Press TV). AP separately confirmed that Iran said it would not reopen the Strait until the US ended its blockade of Iranian ports and lifted sanctions (AP News).
The military dimension is active. US Central Command said a Navy MH-60 helicopter fired two Hellfire missiles to disable the steering gear of a Panama-flagged cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz after it ignored warnings about the US naval blockade (Al Jazeera). That use of force against a third-party vessel underscores the operational friction at the chokepoint even as diplomatic channels remain open.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's interior minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Tehran and met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss closer ties (Al Jazeera). The visit signals that regional actors are engaging Tehran directly at a moment when the Hormuz file is in flux, though the specific deliverables from Naqvi's meetings have not been detailed.
Looking at what this means for the trajectory of the crisis, the structural problem is clear. The Oman-mediated track was designed to address shipping access through the Strait as a standalone technical agreement. Rezaei's formulation, delivered to China's ambassador, re-anchors that track to a far wider set of demands that the US has already rejected in part. The compensation demand is dismissed by Trump. The ceasefire linkage to Gaza and Lebanon introduces parties and conflicts the US is unlikely to fold into a shipping arrangement. And the lifting of sanctions and release of Iranian funds touch the core of the broader US-Iran confrontation, not a maritime corridor.
The appointment of Rezaei as SNSC chief adds a variable. His decision to articulate the full demand set to the Chinese ambassador, rather than through the Omani channel, suggests Tehran may be positioning its conditions before a broader audience, potentially seeking diplomatic backing from Beijing as leverage in any final-stage negotiation with Washington. Whether that broadens the negotiating framework or further entrenches the impasse will depend on whether the Oman deal's "final stages" can survive the gap between what Iran says it requires and what the US says it will accept.
