Why Fighting in Africa's Sahel Is Worse Than Ever
Violence by armed groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State in Africa's Sahel is heading for a record high in 2026, according to figures from conflict monitor ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data). The Guardian
The Sahel is a dry belt south of the Sahara Desert. ACLED focuses on Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as the center of this militancy. It counted 63 violent events with jihadist groups, or armed Islamist extremist groups, in those three countries in 2016, rising to 2,845 in 2025. By September 2026, it had logged 2,145 events, a pace that would mean well over 3,000 for the full year.
More attacks have meant more deaths. The United Nations recorded more than 9,000 deaths from security incidents in those three countries in 2025, as cited in the 2026 Global Peace Index report. Across Africa, deaths tied to militant Islamist violence reached a record 23,872 in 2026, over 20,000 for the fourth year in a row. Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Offensive that reached Kati and retook Kidal
Much of the 2026 rise came from an April offensive in Mali by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaida-linked group active in the Sahel, acting with the Tuareg-dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). They hit strategic towns, government forces and Russian auxiliaries with ambushes, car bombs, drones and raids.
The fighting reached the core of Mali's army. Mali's defence minister died in a suicide attack on his home in Kati, 9 miles north-west of Bamako, in which the head of military intelligence was also killed. In the north, rebels seized the strategic city of Kidal after soldiers fled and a force of Russian mercenaries surrendered, reversing a symbolic victory won by Mali's junta three years earlier.
JNIM also acted outside Mali. In 2026, it claimed more than 130 attacks in Burkina Faso, striking closer to the capital Ouagadougou. In Niger in 2026, it claimed at least 17 attacks but stayed far less active than its rival Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
Fighting between Sahel-based jihadist rivals spilled into Niger, as reported by Reuters on 9 April 2026. Reuters Those rivals clashed hundreds of times, with more than 2,100 deaths, according to ACLED as cited in that reporting.
The bigger picture here is that these groups no longer answer to one leader in one place. ACLED, in an expert comment titled '25 years after 9/11: al-Qaeda's most active affiliates today,' published 15 September 2026, explains how al-Qaeda has fragmented and no longer has one geographical centre 25 years after 9/11. ACLED That came as the United States marked the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks launched by al-Qaida against targets in Washington and New York. The Sahel numbers show the centre of pace has shifted toward Africa, with affiliates able to run combined-arms style offensives and make coordinated claims across borders.
Territorial control and expanding threat
ACLED has also tracked a change in the Islamic State's Sahel branch. In a report titled 'Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion,' it examined the shift from mass violence toward territorial control and its future path. ACLED A separate ACLED report titled 'Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa' found Islamist militants are using growing military strength against state forces and civilians in several regions of Africa.
To understand why that shift matters, think of the difference between smash-and-run attacks and taking over a neighborhood. Mass-casualty raids punish and displace. Holding ground lets a group tax, recruit and keep going. The April tactics in Mali, combining ambushes with car bombs, drones and raids on towns and garrisons, point to groups trying to hold ground and cut state supply lines rather than simply show presence.
Looking at what comes next, three questions stand out. First, whether pressure toward Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Niger's exposure to both JNIM and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara will form one connected pressure zone across the three central Sahelian states, which rank high on ACLED's Conflict Index for high violence. Second, whether the JNIM-FLA link lasts beyond short-term convenience, after overrunning garrisons and forcing surrenders at places like Kidal. Third, whether fights between jihadists, already hundreds of clashes and thousands of deaths, will limit growth or push both sides to attack states and civilians more to win resources and recruits.
In my view, the 2026 numbers are not yet a full-year total but already point past the 2025 mark of 2,845 events. From 63 events in 2016, the decade-long rise has sped up through joint offensives, rivalry between affiliates and a turn toward holding ground.
