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How a Paper Trail Traced Banned Nvidia Chips to China

Martin HollowayPublished 3d ago4 min readBased on 1 source
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How a Paper Trail Traced Banned Nvidia Chips to China
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Bloomberg has reported documents linking a group of companies in China and Singapore to Nvidia AI chips that were not supposed to be sold there. Alice Huang sits at the center of that network. The report was relayed by Engadget on 13 November 2026.

The trail starts in Singapore. Documents that Bloomberg reviewed show chips sold to Aperia Cloud Services. Aperia is an Nvidia Cloud Partner, a company that rents out computing power built on Nvidia hardware. It bought 22 servers from Dell that contained Nvidia H800 chips. The H800 is banned in China. Dell ended its business relationship with Aperia in February 2025 because of concerns about the deal.

The trail then moves to Shanghai. Bloomberg found hardware details in filings from Shanghai Longteng Intelligent Computing, a company that Alice Huang set up a decade ago. Huang has not been part of it since 2017. According to the reporting, Huang Yu, who is identified as Huang's sister, became the majority owner.

The filings list 52 servers made by Super Micro Computer Inc. They contain Nvidia H100 or H200 chips. Neither chip can be sold to Chinese companies without express permission from the US government.

The servers were installed at an AI facility in Shanghai called the Yangtze River Delta Project. Its president is Kang Wei, who is reported to be Huang's husband. Huang was publicly an executive at Megaspeed, a Singaporean company. In 2024, Megaspeed showed investors a rendering of the project and called it the company's largest AI facility.

Bloomberg also reported that US officials believe China's main intelligence agency recruited Huang to target Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. This is a belief held by those officials, as the reporting relays it.

The broader context here is the export control system itself. Think of a shop that refuses to sell a product to one particular buyer. The product can still pass through several middlemen before it reaches the person who actually uses it. Export controls work in a similar way. They depend less on the chipmaker's own sales desk than on the companies in between: the firm that builds the servers, the cloud company that resells computing power, and the businesses that own the buildings. In this case, the reporting points to a decision by one of those middle companies, Dell's end of its relationship with Aperia in February 2025. Whether that kind of checking can keep up with the volume of AI hardware moving through Southeast Asia is a question the industry will have to answer in practice.

In my view, the same records that expose this kind of diversion are also useful for legitimate business. Shipping records, server configuration filings and ownership changes can, once put together, link one facility to specific chip part numbers and to the people who run it. Careful checking of that kind can make the legitimate cloud market easier to audit. That is what allows the market to keep growing with the trust of regulators and customers.