Burnham's New Cabinet: Equal Men and Women, but a Mixed Picture on Class

Andy Burnham's new cabinet has equal numbers of women and men for the first time in British history. But when you look at where those ministers went to school, the picture gets more complicated.
More than a fifth of cabinet members went to private schools (schools you pay to attend) for most of their education. And 54% of ministers studied at Oxford or Cambridge, the UK's two most famous universities. That's up from 29% under the previous prime minister, Keir Starmer (The Guardian, 26 July 2026). Across the whole UK, only about 1% of people went to either of those universities.
The private-school rate in Burnham's cabinet is 22%, more than three times the rate among the general UK population (The Guardian, 24 July 2026). That's much lower than under Boris Johnson, whose first cabinet had nearly two-thirds privately educated members. But it's a step away from the Starmer era, when at times every senior minister had gone to a state school (a free, government-funded school). Education Secretary Bridget Phillipson had described Starmer's team as "probably one of the most class-conscious shadow cabinets that we've had for some time" (The Guardian, 24 July 2026).
The gender milestone has its own tensions. Rachel Reeves was replaced by John Healey as chancellor (the government's top finance job) under Burnham, meaning one fewer woman in the four most senior government roles (The Guardian, 24 July 2026). Keir Starmer's first cabinet in 2024 was 46% women, counting attendees who were not full members. The history runs from Margaret Thatcher's 1979 cabinet, where she was the only woman, through John Major's time with no women in cabinet at all, to Tony Blair's five women in 1997. The swap at the Treasury narrows how far the parity reaches.
Geographically, Burnham has shifted the cabinet northward. Half of cabinet attendees represent northern constituencies (the areas they were elected to represent), including the prime minister himself. Just over a quarter represent north-west England, while only 11% of the UK population lives there. Under Rishi Sunak, the cabinet had only two MPs from northern areas, one of whom was Sunak himself. This regional rebalancing is one of the biggest changes from recent leaders.
The cabinet also shows generational change. Key allies of Keir Starmer were demoted or removed when Burnham formed his government (The Guardian, 24 July 2026), and several new appointments bring personal stories that don't fit a simple class narrative.
Take Kanishka Narayan, the cabinet minister for AI. He was born in Bihar, eastern India, and moved with his family to Cardiff at age 12. His parents ran a petrol station and joined the Labour party soon after arriving in Wales. Narayan attended Eton College (one of Britain's most famous private schools) on a full scholarship, then studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford, earned an MBA at Stanford in the US, and worked in the City of London's financial sector (The Guardian, 26 July 2026). He was appointed Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence on 20 July 2026, after serving in a junior AI role since September 2025 (gov.uk, 22 July 2026). As AI Minister, Narayan will lead the Prime Minister's AI Taskforce and attend cabinet; Lord Vallance was appointed chair of the taskforce alongside Narayan's role (gov.uk, 24 July 2026).
Then there's Miatta Fahnbulleh, the energy secretary, who was also privately educated. She and her family arrived in Britain as asylum seekers (people seeking protection in another country) from Liberia in 1986 (The Guardian, 26 July 2026). Both Narayan and Fahnbulleh have migration stories that intersect with elite education, which makes it harder to put the cabinet's class profile into a neat box.
Research from Sam Friedman, a sociology professor at the LSE, finds that pupils from the nine most exclusive private schools in Britain are 52 times more likely to reach elite positions than those who attend other schools (The Guardian, 26 July 2026). Nick Harrison, chief executive of the Sutton Trust (an organisation that promotes social mobility, meaning the chance for people to move up in society regardless of their background), provides the framework through which these figures are usually judged. The Sutton Trust has long argued that who ends up in cabinet tells us something about who gets access to elite roles more broadly.
The broader context here is a cabinet that moves forward on some fronts while stepping back on others. Gender parity is a genuine first. The northern geographic shift is large by any historical comparison. But the Oxbridge concentration has nearly doubled compared to Starmer's government, and the private-school share, while lower than under Johnson, is still three times the general-population rate. The Narayan and Fahnbulleh appointments show how individual stories of moving up in the world can sit alongside institutional pathways that, overall, stay narrow. Friedman's 52-times figure sharpens the question: it's not whether individual ministers have experienced social mobility, but whether the routes that got them there can work for many people, not just a few. Burnham's cabinet gives evidence on both sides, and where you land depends on which measure matters most to you.


