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Netanyahu Pushes Back on Trump Rift Reports, Moves to Block Turkey's F-35 Bid

Elena MarquezPublished 3w ago4 min readBased on 2 sources
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Netanyahu Pushes Back on Trump Rift Reports, Moves to Block Turkey's F-35 Bid

In back-to-back Fox News appearances, Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed accounts of a fractured relationship with Donald Trump on July 6, 2026, while signalling he will use an upcoming Washington visit to lobby against the transfer of F-35 jets to Turkey.

Netanyahu told Fox News the two leaders "see eye to eye on just about everything" and characterized the US and Israel as "model allies" capable of resolving differences internally. The remarks were his second Fox News interview in two days, per Israel Hayom, and came as Washington and Jerusalem navigate visible policy gaps over the Iran ceasefire and Israel's continued strikes in Lebanon. Netanyahu confirmed a return trip to the US is planned but said no date has been set.

The backdrop is not incidental. The US-Israel war on Iran began on February 28, 2026, and the US and Iran subsequently signed a memorandum of understanding calling for a regional ceasefire that explicitly covers Lebanon. Israel has refused to withdraw from Lebanese territory and asserts an unconditional right to strike the country in response to perceived threats. An Israeli strike in southern Lebanon on July 6 killed four civilians, including a teacher, according to Al Jazeera. That strike landed on the same day Netanyahu was publicly insisting the alliance with Washington is intact — a juxtaposition that makes the diplomatic framing harder to sustain at face value.

The F-35 File and the Turkey Dimension

Netanyahu's announced intention to lobby against F-35 deliveries to Turkey is where the interview carries the most immediate strategic weight. His stated rationale: transferring the aircraft would erode Israeli air superiority and destabilize the regional power balance. Israel's qualitative military edge — the informal but legally codified US commitment under the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding and reinforced through successive security assistance agreements — is the lens through which Jerusalem evaluates any advanced platform sale in the Middle East.

Turkey is a NATO ally and a longstanding applicant for the F-35 program before its 2019 expulsion following the purchase of Russia's S-400 air-defense system. Any US move to restore Ankara's access would require reconciling the original objection — integration of Russian detection architecture with a fifth-generation NATO platform — alongside the political and strategic calculus Trump would bring to the Ankara summit. Trump was scheduled to visit Ankara for a NATO summit later in the week of July 6.

The timing of Netanyahu's public lobbying is deliberate. Speaking before Trump meets Erdogan gives Jerusalem's position a public imprint ahead of any bilateral exchange. It also constrains Trump's negotiating room, because walking back from an F-35 sale after Netanyahu's explicit televised opposition would carry a domestic political cost in the US.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan raised the stakes from the other side on July 4, warning against Israeli efforts to undermine the US-Iran deal. His phrasing — the "war-addicted Israeli government must not be allowed to drown our geography in the smell of gunpowder and blood again" — was unusually direct for a head of government addressing a US ally by name. Turkey has been a consistent critic of Israel's military conduct in Gaza, and the rhetoric from both capitals has sharpened noticeably since the Iran campaign began.

Some Israeli commentators and politicians have begun framing Turkey as the next regional rival after Iran — a rhetorical escalation that, if it migrates from the commentariat into policy language, would reconfigure the geometry of Middle Eastern security arrangements significantly. At present it remains declaratory. But it sets a context in which Netanyahu's F-35 lobbying is not purely about aircraft numbers; it is an early move in a potential repositioning of the Israel-Turkey rivalry from proxy friction to direct strategic competition.

The harder question for Washington is structural. The US-Iran MOU was premised on a broader regional de-escalation. Israel's refusal to honor the Lebanon component and its continued strikes there puts the US in the position of being a guarantor of a ceasefire its closest regional partner is actively breaching. Netanyahu's "model allies" framing offers a diplomatic off-ramp — differences managed privately — but the public record of Israeli strikes makes the private-management argument progressively less credible to the other parties the US needs to hold the MOU together.

Whether Trump, arriving in Ankara for a NATO summit with Erdogan freshly on the offensive, can hold these threads simultaneously is the operative question heading into the second half of the week.