The United States will impose 25% tariffs on certain Brazilian products beginning July 22, 2026, following a year-long Section 301 investigation by the Office of the US Trade Representative that concluded Brazil maintained a range of unfair trade practices, including lax anti-corruption enforcement and unfair tariffs of its own. Brazil's government has condemned the decision and triggered a domestic reciprocity law in response.

The office of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva issued a statement on X repudiating the tariffs and denying that Brazil had engaged in unfair trade practices. President Lula separately blamed his political rival Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, for the measures, citing political considerations ahead of Brazil's October 2026 elections. Flávio Bolsonaro recently visited Washington; his father is an ally of Donald Trump.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the tariff action was necessary "to ensure American workers and companies compete on a level playing field." Greer added that extensive negotiations with Brazil over the past year did not resolve the issues, but that the US remains open to continuing negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio went further, stating that President Lula and his government "have not negotiated with the US in good faith" and that Lula's economic policies are "bad for Americans and bad for Brazilians" (The Guardian).

The tariffs are being imposed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Brazil is the first country targeted under the Trump administration's new tariff strategy using this statute (Reuters). The USTR investigation, formally titled "Brazil's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Digital Trade and Electronic Payment," was directed by President Trump. USTR opened a public hearing request docket on July 17, 2025, convened a public hearing on September 3, 2025, issued its Section 301 determination in June 2026, and scheduled a follow-up hearing on the proposed action for July 6, 2026 (USTR). Latin American countries and some steelmakers argued for tariff exemptions at that July hearing (Reuters).

The tariff order exempts goods not produced in the US or that officials worry would disrupt supply chains, including coffee, beef, oranges and orange juice, some oil and gas energy products, and aerospace parts and components.

Brazil's activation of a reciprocity law opens a legal pathway for retaliatory measures against US goods (teleSUR English). The move signals Brasília's intent to respond symmetrically rather than absorb the tariffs quietly.

The current dispute exists alongside a separate USTR Section 301 investigation into Brazil's connections to forced labor, due to conclude on July 24, 2026 (Reuters). That investigation is part of a broader USTR effort encompassing 60 Section 301 investigations relating to failures to take action on trade in forced labor goods (USTR).

The bilateral relationship has been volatile. Trump previously imposed a 50% tariff on Brazil under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 in protest at Brazil's prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro for attempting to overturn his 2022 election loss. In February 2026, the US Supreme Court ruled against many of Trump's tariffs imposed under IEEPA. Trump's relationship with Lula appeared to improve in May 2026 when Lula visited the White House.

The pivot from IEEPA to Section 301 reflects a procedural recalibration following the Supreme Court's February ruling. Section 301 requires a formal USTR investigation and public hearings, establishing an administrative record that is harder to challenge on the constitutional grounds that undermined the IEEPA-based tariffs. The year-long investigation, the public docket, the September 2025 hearing, and the June 2026 determination each add layers of process that distinguish this action from the earlier emergency-powers approach.

Lula's invocation of Flávio Bolsonaro's Washington visit injects domestic electoral dynamics into what US officials frame as a trade-enforcement matter. With elections in October 2026, the tariffs give Lula a foreign adversary to rally domestic support against, while simultaneously giving Bolsonaro-aligned figures a talking point about Lula's inability to manage the US relationship. The forced-labor investigation, concluding July 24, adds a third dimension: even if the digital trade dispute is resolved, Brazil faces a separate enforcement track that could produce additional trade restrictions within days of the current tariffs taking effect.