Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced on July 17, 2026, that German conventional forces will participate in a French nuclear exercise before the end of the year, a first for the Bundeswehr. Speaking during a joint media conference with French President Emmanuel Macron near Cologne, Germany, Merz hailed the new phase of Franco-German nuclear deterrence cooperation (Al Jazeera).

The announcement followed the July 17 Franco-German Defense and Security Council (DFVSR) meeting at Nörvenich. A joint declaration issued at the meeting stated that Germany and France are prepared to contribute to robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine (bundesregierung.de). The French Élysée Palace published the DFVSR conclusions, specifying that the bilateral nuclear cooperation complements, without replacing, NATO nuclear deterrence (elysee.fr).

Merz stressed that Franco-German cooperation would not replace NATO's nuclear umbrella. He affirmed that Germany remains committed to NATO's nuclear sharing and deterrence arrangements, under which U.S. nuclear bombs are stored in Germany and German warplanes are certified to potentially carry those weapons in an emergency (Al Jazeera).

The bilateral talks between Merz and Macron on July 17 covered deepening cooperation on nuclear deterrence, missile defence, and long-range strike capabilities. The discussions took place against a backdrop of strain in Franco-German defence cooperation, as reported by Reuters on July 16 (Reuters).

As a symbolic kickoff to the new arrangement, French Rafale and German Eurofighter jets participated in a joint in-flight refuelling exercise on July 16. Merz said the nuclear cooperation with France may result in a new 'doctrine' but stated it is far too early to say that. He noted that previous German leaders had refused offers of nuclear cooperation with France (Al Jazeera).

Macron stated that Germany would play a 'vanguard role' in deterrence. He clarified that enhanced nuclear deterrence cooperation would not involve financing from Germany (Al Jazeera).

The July 2026 announcement follows a trajectory established earlier in the year. In March 2026, Macron announced an increase in the French nuclear arsenal and invited European partners to strengthen cooperation on nuclear deterrence. A March 2 joint declaration by Macron and Merz stated that France and Germany decided to strengthen their deterrence cooperation in response to evolving threats (elysee.fr). On the same day, Macron visited the Île Longue submarine base, France's nuclear submarine base, six years after his previous speech there (elysee.fr). The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs published an official statement confirming that France and Germany agreed to take first concrete steps on deterrence cooperation beginning in 2026 (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs).

Germany described its initial talks with France on nuclear deterrence as being at an early stage in February 2026 (Reuters). At the Munich Security Conference, Merz confirmed he had begun initial talks with Macron on European nuclear deterrence (bundesregierung.de).

Looking at the broader European security architecture, several nations have expressed interest in the French nuclear deterrence initiative. The UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway have all signaled interest in the framework (Al Jazeera).

At a press conference with the leaders of the three Baltic states on July 3, 2026, in Berlin, Merz said the US-led nuclear deterrence apparatus within NATO must be strengthened (bundesregierung.de). Germany is simultaneously implementing a major rearmament plan aimed at building Europe's strongest conventional military by 2039 (Al Jazeera).

The July 17 developments clarify how European states are navigating between existing NATO commitments and the French initiative. The DFVSR conclusions build on a September 2025 statement that nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of the Alliance's security (elysee.fr). The joint declaration emphasizes that France's independent strategic nuclear forces contribute to the Alliance's security (bundesregierung.de).

The arrangement attempts to bridge competing pressures in European security. Germany maintains its commitments to NATO's nuclear sharing while integrating its conventional forces into a parallel French-led framework. The participation of German conventional forces in French exercises allows Berlin to deepen bilateral defence ties without requiring direct financial contributions to the French arsenal. The interest from other European states suggests the French framework may develop into a broader multilateral consultation mechanism.