Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has described being pulled from rubble after a joint US-Israeli airstrike on 28 February 2026 that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, offering the most detailed first-person account to date of an operation that eliminated Iran's paramount leader and triggered a succession crisis inside the Islamic Republic. Araghchi gave the interview to Iranian journalist Javad Mogouyi, published online on a Sunday and reported by The Guardian on 22 July 2026 (The Guardian).

Araghchi confirmed that Israel and the United States possessed accurate intelligence on the location of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials. The strikes began shortly after 9 am local time, timed to coincide with a gathering of senior officials across three institutions: the ministry of intelligence, the strategic council on foreign policy, and the defence council. Araghchi was reporting to Ali Asghar Hijazi, Khamenei's deputy chief of staff, when three blasts shook the building within seconds. The third explosion struck almost directly adjacent, hitting the section where Hijazi's office was located and completely destroying the left side of the building. Hijazi's secretary was killed instantly. Araghchi and Hijazi survived and climbed out through collapsed ceilings, walls, and rubble. Araghchi's official car had been hit in the strike, and a passerby rushed him to the foreign ministry.

The account raises serious questions about the depth of the intelligence penetration that enabled the strike. On 19 July 2026, three days before The Guardian's report, Araghchi told The Times of Israel that the intelligence breach had likely not been patched and "probably still exists" (Times of Israel). For an Iranian security establishment that prides itself on operational secrecy around its most senior leadership, that admission is striking: the foreign minister is effectively conceding that the same intelligence pipeline that located Khamenei may still be active and accessible to adversarial services.

The diplomatic lead-up to the strike is equally significant. Araghchi confirmed that Iran had offered the United States a deal on its nuclear programme during the final round of talks in Geneva. Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi told Araghchi the day after those Geneva talks that the mood in Washington had become more bellicose. The timeline suggests that even as Iran was presenting concessions at the negotiating table, Washington and Tel Aviv were either finalizing or executing plans for a decapitation strike against the supreme leader.

Iran's institutional response to the killing followed pre-drawn contingency plans. Araghchi disclosed that Tehran had prepared plans codenamed "Code 110" to close the Strait of Hormuz if the supreme leader was targeted. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption through its narrow channels; an Iranian attempt to close it would constitute a direct threat to the global energy supply and almost certainly trigger a military response from the United States and its Gulf allies. Whether Iran has activated or will activate Code 110 remains one of the most consequential unanswered questions stemming from the February strike.

Succession was resolved within days. Al Jazeera reported on 1 March 2026 that Araghchi suggested a new supreme leader might be chosen within days, and Khamenei's son Mojtaba was ultimately appointed to the position (Al Jazeera). Araghchi said he had not yet met Mojtaba Khamenei in his new capacity but characterized the appointment as signaling "no change in regime policies." Araghchi also called the killing of Ali Khamenei "absolutely unprecedented and a major violation of international law."

Funeral processions were held around 2–3 July 2026. Reuters reported on 2 July that Iran warned the US and Israel against further attacks ahead of the processions (Reuters). On 3 July, Iran's president and Araghchi attended the funeral proceedings. By 25 March, Araghchi stated in an interview with Iranian state TV that his government had not engaged in any conversations with the United States since the strike (Associated Press).

The broader context here is a regime navigating three simultaneous crises: a leadership transition with a dynastic dimension that risks factional backlash, a demonstrated and apparently ongoing intelligence failure at the highest levels of the security apparatus, and a rupture in the diplomatic channel that represented the last formal interface between Tehran and Washington. Araghchi's decision to speak publicly in such detail, five months after the strike, may reflect an effort to consolidate a narrative. By emphasizing that Iran was engaged in good-faith nuclear negotiations when the strike occurred, he positions the attack as a betrayal of diplomacy. By acknowledging the intelligence breach remains unpatched, he signals urgency to domestic security services. And by confirming that Code 110 exists, he issues an implicit reminder that Iran retains escalation options that the US and Israel cannot ignore. What remains unclear is whether Mojtaba Khamenei's "no change" posture will hold under the pressure of an unresolved intelligence compromise and an international community still absorbing the precedent set by the targeted killing of a sitting supreme leader.