Angola Convicts Two Russian Nationals of Terrorism and Espionage in Landmark Verdict

An Angolan court has found two Russian men guilty of terrorism and spying, sentencing political consultant Igor Ratchin to 11 years in prison and translator Lev Lakshtanov to 8 years. The verdict, reported on July 23, 2026, The Guardian, concludes a case that links a domestic political crisis to the expanding footprint of Russian influence operations across sub-Saharan Africa.
Angolan prosecutors accused Lakshtanov and Ratchin of planning a coup and helping organize the deadly demonstrations that rocked Angola in mid-2025. The two men denied the charges, claiming they were in the country for cultural and business activities. Prosecutors alleged their objective was to influence Angola's next presidential elections by either funding UNITA, the country's largest opposition party, or by engineering a leadership change within the ruling MPLA.
The MPLA has governed Angola since independence from Portugal in 1975. During the country's 1975–2002 civil war, the Soviet Union and Cuba backed the MPLA, while the United States and apartheid South Africa supported UNITA. President João Lourenço, in power since 2017, has shifted Angola's foreign policy orientation toward improved relations with the US and Europe, a recalibration that gives the case geopolitical resonance beyond Luanda.
The protests at the center of the prosecution's case began on July 12, 2025, when Angolan police used rubber bullets and teargas to disperse a peaceful demonstration against rising fuel prices. Human Rights Watch described the response as "excessive force." Two weeks later, from July 28 to 30, a minibus taxi strike over fuel price hikes descended into riots and looting. Official figures put the death toll at 22, with more than 1,600 arrested. Angolan security forces faced accusations of firing live ammunition at protesters, a charge the government countered by defending its "progressive" use of force as justified.
Prosecutors further claimed that Lakshtanov and Ratchin were connected to Africa Politology, a Russian disinformation and propaganda network that originated within the Wagner mercenary group. According to reporting by The Guardian and an investigation by Forbidden Stories, Africa Politology was taken over by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) following the death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023. The Wagner group itself was subsequently rebranded as Africa Corps and absorbed into Russia's formal military structure.
This organizational lineage matters because it situates the Angola case within a continent-wide pattern of Russian paramilitary and intelligence activity. The Wagner group, and later Africa Corps, has provided security for Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra since 2017. In 2021, Wagner forces deployed to Mali in support of the military junta. Africa Corps now backs military regimes in Niger and Burkina Faso. Since 2023, according to a US Congress report, Russian troops have been deployed in Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Sudan. And in Madagascar, President Michael Randrianirina, who took power in a coup in October 2025, has significantly boosted ties with Moscow: Russians now serve in his presidential guard, and a weekly program on Madagascar-Russia relations launched on national television earlier in July 2026.
The broader context here is that the Luanda verdict represents the first known instance of an African government criminally prosecuting and convicting individuals linked by prosecutors to the SVR's Africa Politology network. Other African states hosting Russian paramilitary or intelligence operatives have generally integrated those actors into existing security structures or formalized bilateral arrangements. Angola's MPLA government, by contrast, has treated the alleged network as a threat to its electoral sovereignty, despite the party's own Cold War ties to Moscow. The conviction also raises practical questions about whether other African governments navigating Russian security partnerships will recalibrate their posture, or whether Angola's approach remains an outlier driven by its specific domestic crisis and Lourenço's Western-leaning foreign policy.
The case additionally exposes the institutional continuity between Wagner's covert operations under Prigozhin and the SVR's current portfolio. Africa Politology's alleged activities in Angola, funding opposition elements and seeking to force intra-party leadership changes, align with what Western intelligence services have described as Moscow's broader strategy of cultivating political leverage across multiple African states simultaneously, rather than committing to a single faction.
What remains unresolved is whether the convictions will trigger any formal diplomatic response from Moscow, and whether other African governments will follow Angola's lead in prosecuting rather than accommodating Russian operatives linked to influence networks operating on their territory.


