Russian authorities used Cellebrite forensic software to examine the phone of Andrey Pivovarov, a well-known activist. This finding, reported by Access Now on 25 June 2026, is surprising because Cellebrite, an Israeli company, announced it would stop selling its products to Russia and Belarus in March 2021.

The question is: how did Russian authorities get the software if the company stopped selling to them? It could have been purchased before the ban took effect. It could have been sold indirectly through a third party. Cellebrite has not explained how the tools arrived in Russian hands. The investigation confirms they were used, but not where they came from.

Pivovarov is a prominent figure in Russian civil society. His case is not isolated. In December 2024, Amnesty International reported that authorities in Serbia used the same Cellebrite software to target journalists and activists. Different countries, same pattern: governments using commercially available digital tools against people they consider threats.

Cellebrite makes software designed to extract data from phones and computers. The company says its tools are not hacking—they are legitimate forensic work, similar to police opening a locked filing cabinet with a warrant. That argument makes sense when courts are independent and genuinely oversee what police do. It makes less sense when the government itself is the threat.

The software is called UFED, and it does practical things: it copies everything on a device, finds deleted files, and unlocks encrypted storage when authorities have legal permission. For police investigating actual crimes in countries with working court systems, these tools serve a real purpose. The problem the Pivovarov case illustrates is that nothing in the software itself stops a government from using it against a dissident or activist.

This is not a new problem in technology. Companies that sell surveillance or security tools have faced this issue for years. Firms like NSO Group, which makes spyware, have dealt with the same criticism—that their tools end up harming innocent people in authoritarian countries. Cellebrite is slightly different because its software requires physical access to a device rather than remote delivery. But the end result is the same: a person's private information examined by the state without any real oversight.

Cellebrite has not publicly answered how the tools reached Russian authorities, or what it will do to prevent this kind of use in the future. The investigation by Citizen Lab is detailed, but some questions remain. As journalists and human rights organizations dig deeper, more details will likely emerge about where these tools came from and how long they have been in use.