President Donald Trump has approved a nuclear agreement that may allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium, according to two Associated Press sources AP via KDVR. The approval was reported on July 22, 2026.

This deal has been in the works for over a year. In May 2025, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia outlined plans to cooperate on civil nuclear energy — meaning nuclear power for electricity, not weapons — including safety, security, and programs to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons U.S. Department of Energy. That same month, Reuters reported that the Trump administration had decoupled the nuclear talks from demands that Saudi Arabia normalize relations with Israel Reuters. Under the previous administration, linking the two issues had been a diplomatic roadblock.

In November 2025, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Arabia's energy minister signed an agreement confirming the negotiations were complete U.S. Department of Energy. The Department of Energy published the announcement on its website, and the National Nuclear Security Administration — the U.S. agency responsible for nuclear security — was referenced in the declaration. The DOE later listed the deal as one of its nuclear-sector achievements in a January 2026 review U.S. Department of Energy.

The sticking point throughout has been nonproliferation — the effort to make sure countries with nuclear technology for electricity don't use it to build weapons.

In February 2026, Reuters reported on a document indicating that the U.S. was removing protective guardrails from the proposed Saudi nuclear deal, and that Trump told Congress he was pursuing a pact without nonproliferation safeguards Reuters. By May 2026, a letter viewed by Reuters confirmed that Trump planned to seek congressional approval for a pact that lacked strict nonproliferation guardrails Reuters.

The July 22 AP report that Trump has now approved the agreement is the furthest the deal has gotten toward taking effect. Whether Congress will add conditions or changes during its review is an open question.

The broader context here is a tension between expanding nuclear energy and keeping weapons from spreading. The U.S. has a legal framework for sharing nuclear technology with other countries, and the strictest version of these agreements has historically required the partner country to promise it will not enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel on its own. Uranium enrichment is the process of concentrating a specific form of uranium to fuel nuclear reactors — but the same process, taken further, can produce material for a nuclear weapon.

The best-known example is a 2009 deal with the United Arab Emirates. The UAE voluntarily gave up the right to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel in exchange for access to U.S. nuclear technology and fuel. Saudi Arabia has consistently said it will not accept that restriction, arguing it should have the same rights as other countries that have signed the global nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

If the agreement goes through and allows enrichment, it would break from that earlier standard. For experts who track nuclear weapons proliferation, the concern is straightforward: once a country has enrichment facilities, the gap between producing fuel for power plants and producing material for weapons shrinks. The process takes time, but the facilities are built to last.

For markets, the effects could touch several industries. U.S. companies that build nuclear reactors and related equipment would gain access to a wealthy new customer. Saudi Arabia wants to build a lot of nuclear power plants so it can burn less of its own oil and gas at home and sell more of it abroad. Companies that mine and sell uranium — the raw material for nuclear fuel — could see shifts in both demand and supply if Saudi Arabia eventually starts producing its own fuel. The involvement of the National Nuclear Security Administration suggests the U.S. government expects to stay engaged on security matters, even if the formal rules are relaxed.

The delinking from Israel normalization also matters. It removed the main diplomatic condition that had been slowing the deal, and it signals the administration is willing to move forward on energy ties without tying them to a broader regional security agreement. Whether that makes Congress more resistant or more cooperative depends on how key senators weigh the loosened nonproliferation rules against the strategic and commercial benefits.

What is known: Trump has approved the agreement. It may allow enrichment. The guardrails described in February and May 2026 lacked strict nonproliferation conditions. What is not yet known: the final text, the congressional response, and whether any conditions get added during the review period. Those are the things to watch.