Andy Burnham Contacted by Someone Posing as Trump's Chief of Staff

Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham exchanged messages with someone pretending to be Susie Wiles, chief of staff to US President Donald Trump, before realising the contact was not genuine, Politico reported.

Officials said only a "few messages" passed between Burnham and the impersonator, according to Politico. The exchange involved texts, not a live conversation. Sources told the outlet that "no messages of significance" were shared and that the messages were "quickly reported to the appropriate authorities" once they aroused suspicion. (BBC)

Downing Street declined to comment on the breach. A UK government spokesperson said: "We do not comment on national security matters." (BBC)

The incident fits a known pattern. The BBC reported in May 2025 that the FBI had opened an investigation into the hacking of Wiles' phone. Wiles said her personal phone, not her government device, had been compromised. The impersonator or impersonators then used her contacts file — essentially her stored address book — to message other senior US figures, including senators, governors and top business executives. (BBC)

Wiles was also among those targeted by a cyber espionage unit linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guards in 2024, according to the BBC. That earlier targeting provides a plausible backdrop for the impersonation campaign that later reached Burnham, though the facts do not establish a direct link between the two. (BBC)

The broader context matters for those who work in and around Westminster. Burnham, as Mayor of Greater Manchester, sits outside the Commons (the lower house of Parliament) but remains one of the most prominent Labour figures in English local government. Any contact between a senior UK elected official and someone claiming to represent the White House chief of staff carries obvious sensitivity, even if the messages exchanged were, per sources, of no significance. The speed of reporting to authorities once suspicion was raised is the detail officials are likely to emphasise, and the absence of any substantive exchange limits the potential for operational compromise.

The refusal by Downing Street and the UK government to comment is consistent with long-standing practice on national security matters. It offers little indication of how the incident is being handled internally. What it does signal is that the matter is being treated as a security question rather than a political one, which is notable given the political profile of the figure involved.

For those tracking the Wiles impersonation thread more broadly, the Burnham contact adds a UK dimension to what appears to have been a wide-reaching operation. The targeting of Wiles' personal phone and the exploitation of her contacts file suggest the impersonator or impersonators were seeking to leverage the trust inherent in established professional networks — much as a fraudster might use a stolen address book to pose as a known colleague. The list of recipients already identified, including senators, governors and business executives, now extends, at least tangentially, to a senior UK regional politician.

The distinction between Wiles' personal and government phones is a detail worth holding onto. The compromise of a personal device, outside the security perimeter of official government communications infrastructure, is a vector — a route of attack — that is difficult to defend against through conventional state protective measures. It depends on individual vigilance and the speed with which recipients identify and report anomalous contact. By that metric, the Burnham episode appears to have been contained quickly, though the absence of comment from government leaves a gap between what officials have told Politico and what is formally on the record.

What remains unclear is whether the impersonation attempt that reached Burnham is directly connected to the earlier Iranian Revolutionary Guards-linked targeting of Wiles, or whether it represents a separate actor exploiting the same compromised contacts. The BBC's reporting establishes the Wiles phone hack and the subsequent impersonation campaign as documented events, and places Burnham among those contacted. It does not establish attribution for the impersonation itself beyond the prior IRGC association. That gap is likely to persist given the national security sensitivities the government has cited in declining to comment.