Why the U.S. Is Sanctioning the International Criminal Court — and Who's Pushing Back
The U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on International Criminal Court President Tomoko Akane and a senior ICC trial lawyer in August 2026, according to Treasury Department website postings reported by Reuters on August 18 (Reuters). Japan's government described the action as "very unfortunate" on August 19, a rare public criticism of its U.S. ally (Reuters).
The sanctions on Akane cap an escalating U.S. campaign against the ICC that began with a February 2025 executive order. That order, titled "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court," authorized sanctions on prosecutors, judges, and others working with the Court (White House). The order revived a sanctions framework rooted in Executive Order 13928, which had originally set criteria for sanctions and the suspension of entry for targeted individuals. A 2021 White House budget document noted that an earlier executive order lifting ICC-related sanctions had also lifted the suspension of entry for persons meeting those criteria, meaning the 2025 framework reactivated those restrictions (White House).
Sanctions, in this context, are government-imposed financial and travel restrictions designed to pressure individuals or institutions by cutting off their access to funds and movement.
The State Department moved quickly to implement the new framework. In June 2025, it sanctioned four individuals then serving as ICC judges, citing the Court's "illegitimate actions targeting the United States and Israel" (State Department). The State Department justified the move by noting that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC. In August 2025, the State Department designated ICC Deputy Prosecutors Shameem Khan and Niang under further sanctions, again citing actions against Americans and Israelis (State Department).
The campaign deepened in December 2025, when the State Department announced sanctions on ICC judges directly engaged in the investigation, arrest, detention, or prosecution of Israeli nationals without Israel's consent (State Department). The State Department maintains a dedicated ICC sanctions page listing "ICC Judges Directly Engaged in the Illegitimate Targeting of Israel," dated September 4, 2025 (State Department).
Beyond individual designations, the administration pursued a broader effort to isolate the Court institutionally. In July 2026, the Trump administration launched an effort to isolate the ICC, with options under consideration including travel bans and visa restrictions (Reuters). Trump said later that month that the campaign to dismantle the ICC was intended to defend Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Reuters).
Legal pushback has been concurrent. Three ICC judges sued the Trump administration in June 2026, arguing that the sanctions measures were unlawful (Reuters). U.S. human rights groups followed with their own lawsuit against the administration's anti-ICC push in August 2026 (Reuters).
The broader context here involves a fundamental collision between two principles: U.S. assertions of national sovereignty over countries that never joined the ICC, and the Court's exercise of universal jurisdiction over alleged atrocity crimes. The U.S. position, as articulated by the State Department, rests on the Rome Statute's non-party status of both the U.S. and Israel — meaning neither country ratified the treaty that created the Court, and the U.S. argues the ICC therefore has no authority over their nationals. The sanctions reach the Court's senior leadership, including its president and deputy prosecutors, and they target not only individual jurists but also the institutional infrastructure of international criminal justice. Japan's public rebuke matters because it signals that the U.S. campaign is straining alliances even with partners who are not ICC members. The lawsuits from judges and human rights organizations raise statutory and constitutional questions about executive authority to impose financial and travel restrictions on officers of an international tribunal.
Looking at what this means for the Court's operations, the sanctions create direct operational pressure on the ICC. Designating the Court's president and a senior trial lawyer restricts their access to the international financial system and, through the reactivated Executive Order 13928 framework, subjects them to suspension of entry into the United States. This is distinct from rhetorical opposition: it imposes concrete costs on individuals carrying out the Court's mandate. Whether the litigation will constrain the executive's use of sanctions authorities, and whether allies like Japan will move beyond criticism to active resistance, are the threads to watch as the campaign continues.
