Rwanda's Kagame Blames Congo for Eastern Conflict, Citing Support for FDLR Armed Group

Rwandan President Paul Kagame has accused the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of arming and integrating the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) into its own security forces, blaming Kinshasa for the continuing conflict in the country's east. At a news conference in Kigali on August 25, 2026, Kagame said the FDLR's presence on Congolese territory is Rwanda's primary security concern and that "if this problem is not resolved, it is natural for Rwanda to remain involved" in the conflict. Al Jazeera

Kagame said Rwanda possesses intelligence that Congolese authorities are arming the FDLR and folding its members into Congolese security forces. The evidence, he said, includes testimony from former FDLR fighters, some of whom returned voluntarily to Rwanda and others who were captured, and who "tell the same story." Kagame added that United States, European, and United Nations missions have visited the Mutobo Demobilisation and Reintegration Centre near Musanze in northern Rwanda, where they heard testimony from former FDLR combatants. The centre, which operates under Rwanda's Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, disarms former fighters arriving from eastern DRC, particularly the FDLR, and prepares them for civilian life through training and financial support.

The FDLR was formed from remnants of the Rwandan army accused of involvement in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Kigali considers the group an existential security threat operating from Congolese territory, a position it has maintained consistently. Rwanda's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously described DRC support to the FDLR as "a matter of state policy, not the choice of individual actors," and called ending that support "a condition to be ensured." The foreign ministry has also condemned the Congolese Army (FARDC) and the Burundian Army (FDNB), together with what it termed "a coalition of DRC-backed FDLR genocidal militias," for violating the ceasefire of the Washington Accords.

Kagame sharply criticised calls for Rwanda to stay out of the crisis in eastern DRC, saying those making such calls should first address the FDLR. "Remove this problem, and then see whether Rwanda is using it as an excuse or not," he said. He stressed that protecting Rwanda's security is a non-negotiable priority and added, "The right thing to do is to protect ourselves, and we will do so without fear, day or night and at any time." He said Rwanda seeks to work with countries in the region to achieve peace and is "ready to fight for it."

The reciprocal accusations form the core of the standoff. Kinshasa accuses Kigali of supporting the M23 movement, an armed group in eastern DRC, and of deploying Rwandan troops into Congolese territory. Rwanda denies those allegations. In late July 2026, Congo and Rwanda sparred over a protocol to disarm Rwandan rebels, with each side restating its long-standing charges: Rwanda accusing Congo of cooperating with the FDLR, and Kinshasa accusing Kigali of backing the AFC/M23. Reuters

Kagame's remarks come despite a layered diplomatic architecture designed to resolve precisely this conflict. On March 18, 2025, Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani brokered a meeting between Kagame and DRC President Felix Tshisekedi, described as historic, which produced two peace tracks: one between Rwanda and the DRC, and another among the parties to the conflict within the DRC. On June 27, 2025, Rwanda and the DRC signed a peace agreement in Washington that included provisions to end support for armed groups, respect sovereignty, coordinate security efforts, and plan for regional economic integration. Qatar subsequently hosted talks that produced the Doha Framework Agreement for Peace, signed on November 15, 2025, between the DRC government and the M23. That framework contains eight implementation protocols aimed at protecting civilians, restoring state authority, and strengthening national reconciliation and economic and social development, with Qatar, the US, and the African Union overseeing implementation.

A joint statement from the Second Joint Oversight Committee meeting on the peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda noted that both countries reaffirmed their obligation to immediately and unconditionally cease any state support to non-state armed groups. Yet the agreement's core provisions are precisely what each side accuses the other of violating. Rwanda's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asserted that the ongoing conflict in eastern DRC was triggered by constant ceasefire violations by Congolese forces and the FDLR. Rwanda has also accused a military coalition currently deployed in eastern DRC, comprising the Congolese Army, the FDLR, and Burundian forces, of operating against Rwanda. DRC Foreign Minister Christophe Lutundula, in an interview with RFI, accused Rwanda of violating Congolese sovereignty.

The international dimension has hardened. The US imposed sanctions (penalties restricting trade or financial activity) on Rwanda's military forces over its role in supporting the AFC/M23 rebel group, a step that signalled growing Washington frustration even as the State Department co-sponsored the June 2025 peace agreement. In January 2026, Rwanda's Ambassador Mathilde told the US House Foreign Affairs Committee that Rwanda's national security is non-negotiable and cited decades of cross-border genocidal threats from the FDLR and allied groups. UN experts had already said in August 2022 that Rwanda had intervened militarily in eastern Congo, with Rwanda in turn accusing Congo of using the FDLR as a proxy force, a charge Kinshasa denied.

The broader context here is that the diplomatic instruments built over the past eighteen months are under severe strain. Three separate agreements, the bilateral Washington accord, the Doha Framework, and the joint oversight mechanism, were all predicated on the same bargain: each party ceases support for the other's adversaries. Kagame's news conference makes clear that Rwanda views the FDLR as the originating threat and its own involvement as a downstream consequence. His challenge to the international community, to remove the FDLR and observe whether Rwanda withdraws, places the burden of proof on those calling for Rwandan restraint. But with the US having sanctioned Rwandan forces and Kinshasa maintaining its own accusations of Rwandan military presence, the credibility of each side's commitments under the existing agreements will be tested by facts on the ground, not by statements in Kigali or Kinshasa.

Kagame's framing also serves a diplomatic purpose. By positioning the FDLR as the root cause and Rwanda's involvement as reactive, he sought to reframe the narrative ahead of any further implementation talks. The reference to foreign missions visiting Mutobo is an invitation to international actors to assess Rwanda's evidence directly. Whether that evidence satisfies the same international partners who sanctioned Rwanda's military earlier this year will shape the trajectory of the peace process.