Politics

Internal Document Puts Toronto–Quebec City High-Speed Rail Cost at $150-Billion Over 40 Years

Graham ThorntonPublished 3w ago4 min readBased on 2 sources
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Internal Document Puts Toronto–Quebec City High-Speed Rail Cost at $150-Billion Over 40 Years
Image by zheng2088 from Pixabay

An internal document obtained by The Globe and Mail estimates the full cost of the Toronto-to-Quebec City high-speed rail line at roughly $150-billion once four decades of operating and maintenance expenses are included — nearly double the public cost estimate from the Crown corporation building the line.

The document, titled "Technical Briefing DRAFT," was prepared in September 2023 for the CEO of what was then called VIA HFR-VIA TGF Inc., the entity originally tasked with pursuing a high-frequency rail plan along the Quebec City–Windsor corridor. The corporation was renamed Alto in early 2024, when then-prime minister Justin Trudeau announced the project would focus on high-speed rail rather than the earlier, lower-speed high-frequency concept.

Alto has publicly said the line will cost between $60-billion and $90-billion. The internal briefing document's "Rough Order of Magnitude" estimate, spanning a 40-year period, ranges from $148.1-billion to $152.7-billion. The gap turns on what costs are counted: Alto's public range covers infrastructure capital — the physical construction of the line — while the internal document adds rolling stock (the trains themselves) and decades of operations and maintenance. (The Globe and Mail)

The briefing document breaks the project's costs into three components. Infrastructure capital is estimated at $83.5-billion, which falls within Alto's publicly cited $60-billion-to-$90-billion range. Rolling stock is projected at $2-billion to $2.2-billion. Operating and maintenance costs over the 40-year period are estimated at $62.6-billion to $67-billion.

On the revenue side, the same document projects $105-billion in total revenue over the 40 years, with fare revenue expected to more than cover day-to-day operational expenses. That projection, if realized, would offset a significant portion of operating and maintenance costs but would not recover the infrastructure capital investment.

Versions of the briefing document were released under access to information laws in late 2024, but the key financial figures were redacted — blacked out — in those disclosures. The figures now reported come from the unredacted draft obtained by The Globe and Mail.

The internal cost picture carries political weight. Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre has pledged to cancel the Toronto–Quebec City high-speed rail project if he becomes prime minister. A $150-billion lifecycle cost, even one that includes decades of operations, gives opposition critics a larger number to campaign against than the $60-billion-to-$90-billion construction estimate that has anchored public discussion of the file.

Alto, for its part, has pointed to broader economic returns. The Crown corporation estimates the benefits to travellers and communities along the corridor at up to $49.5-billion over the first 60 years of operation, a figure that extends beyond the 40-year costing window in the internal document. (Alto)

The broader context here is that the gap between the public and internal figures is, in part, a matter of accounting scope. Capital construction and lifecycle operations are distinct cost categories, and infrastructure projects of this scale routinely present different numbers depending on which categories are included and over what time horizon. What the internal document makes clear is the scale of the total commitment when the full lifecycle is tallied.

For a federal government weighing a megaproject that crosses three provinces and touches the most densely populated corridor in the country, the internal figures offer a more complete, if still preliminary, picture of the fiscal exposure. The "Rough Order of Magnitude" label signals that these are early-stage projections, not final costing. Still, the gap between what Alto has disclosed publicly and what its own briefing document lays out internally is wide enough to shape the political debate over a project that has yet to see major construction begin.