Rubio's Latin America Tour: Trade, Military Ties, and a Push to Counter China
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella in Barranquilla on September 8, 2026, as part of a three-nation diplomatic tour through Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru. The tour's stated goals: consolidate relationships with allied governments and expand US military involvement in the region. Rubio said the Trump administration hopes to ink "good, solid" trade deals in the near future with all three countries, framing the push as part of a broader effort to deepen economic and security ties with right-wing allies across Latin America Al Jazeera.
The Barranquilla meeting produced concrete agreements. De la Espriella and Rubio signed deals on critical minerals (minerals essential to technology and defense supply chains, such as lithium and rare earth elements) and civil nuclear cooperation. De la Espriella, who took office in August 2026 on a platform promising a return to a militarised approach toward crime and armed groups, said afterward that Colombia wants to re-establish itself as the United States' primary partner in hemispheric security. He indicated he would seek US support for military operations, including through radar and drone technology. Rubio emphasized shared interests in countering what he called regional transnational criminal terrorism and deepening economic engagement Al Jazeera.
The tour fits within a broader Trump administration framework for the Western Hemisphere, informally dubbed the "Donroe Doctrine," which pushes for greater US control over the hemisphere. Since taking office for a second term, Trump has authorized lethal military actions in Venezuela, the eastern Pacific Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea, described by the administration as critical to combatting drug trafficking. The administration has also invited the region's conservative leaders to join the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (ACCC), or the "Shield of the Americas," a regional security framework emphasizing US military involvement to combat drugs and crime Al Jazeera.
Rubio was scheduled to travel later in the week to Ecuador and Peru to meet with Presidents Daniel Noboa and Keiko Fujimori, respectively. The State Department's own readout from September 8 noted that Rubio considers Ecuador one of the United States' closest security partners in the region State Department. NPR reported on September 7 that Rubio has been making Latin America a priority even as other foreign policy matters compete for attention NPR. Reuters had previewed the trip on September 4, reporting that talks would focus on tackling drug trafficking, expanding trade, and deepening cooperation Reuters.
The diplomatic tour is also aimed at checking China's growing influence in Latin America. China signed a free-trade agreement with Peru in 2009 and has since become Peru's top trading partner, surpassing the United States. The administration's trade push with all three Andean nations reads as a direct competitive response to that footprint, particularly in Peru, where Chinese commercial dominance is now entrenched Al Jazeera.
The Colombia leg drew sharp domestic pushback. Leftist presidential candidate Ivan Cepeda slammed Rubio's visit as an "act of surrendering strategic aspects of our sovereignty," pointing to the mineral and energy agreements signed on September 8. Cepeda also criticized de la Espriella's decision to loosen gun restrictions on the same day as the deals, a position echoing Trump administration policy Al Jazeera.
Rubio's regional engagement extends well beyond this tour. In September 2025, he held a joint press availability with Mexican Foreign Secretary Juan Ramon de la Fuente in which both countries reaffirmed cooperation on security matters based on principles of reciprocity State Department. In August 2025, Rubio signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Paraguayan Foreign Minister Ruben Ramirez Lezcano and the US Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, focused on establishing safe third country agreements (arrangements where asylum seekers are redirected to a third country for processing) within Latin America and South America State Department. Earlier, in February 2025, Rubio met with Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves Robles, discussing cybersecurity and describing Costa Rica as one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America State Department.
The broader context here is one of convergence across multiple tracks at once: trade pacts, critical mineral supply agreements, military technology transfers, civil nuclear cooperation, and counter-cartel architecture. The ACCC framework, combined with bilateral deals on radar and drone capabilities, points toward an integrated security architecture that would embed US military involvement more deeply in partner nations than at any point in recent years. De la Espriella's eagerness to position Colombia as Washington's "primary partner" in hemispheric security suggests that at least some regional governments are willing to bid for that role rather than hedge between Washington and Beijing.
There is a counterargument, and Cepeda articulated it: the mineral and nuclear agreements amount to strategic concessions bundled with domestic security policy changes that mirror US preferences. The simultaneous loosening of gun restrictions and signing of energy deals on the same day lends weight to the criticism that these are coordinated packages rather than independent policy decisions. How Noboa and Fujimori receive similar proposals in the coming days will indicate whether the administration's model is exportable beyond Colombia or faces friction in different political contexts.
