Sahel Violence Linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State Is Heading for a Record Year
Violence involving Islamist extremist groups in Africa's Sahel is on track to reach a historic high in 2026, after offensives by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State, according to figures compiled by conflict monitor ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data). The Guardian
ACLED treats Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as the centre of Islamic militancy in the Sahel, the semi-arid belt south of the Sahara. It recorded 63 violent events involving jihadist groups in those three countries in 2016, rising to 2,845 in 2025. For 2026, it had logged 2,145 such events by the September data, a pace that would mean well over 3,000 for the full year if trends continue.
Deaths have tracked that expansion. The United Nations recorded more than 9,000 deaths from security incidents across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in 2025, as cited in the 2026 Global Peace Index report. Across Africa, deaths linked to militant Islamist violence reached a record 23,872 in 2026, passing 20,000 for the fourth consecutive year. Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Offensive that reached Kati and retook Kidal
Much of the 2026 surge came from an April offensive in Mali by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaida-linked network operating in the Sahel, acting jointly with the Tuareg-dominated Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a northern separatist movement. The operation hit strategic towns, government forces and Russian auxiliaries, or Russian fighters backing the state, with ambushes, car bombs, drones and raids.
The offensive reached the core of Mali's military establishment. Mali's defence minister died in a suicide attack on his residence in Kati, 9 miles north-west of Bamako, in which the head of military intelligence was also killed. Further north, rebels seized control of the strategic city of Kidal after soldiers fled and a force of Russian mercenaries surrendered, reversing a symbolic victory won by Mali's junta three years earlier.
JNIM pressure was not confined to Mali. In 2026, JNIM claimed more than 130 attacks in Burkina Faso, striking closer to the capital Ouagadougou. In Niger in 2026, JNIM claimed at least 17 attacks but remained significantly less active than its rival Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
A second layer added to the toll. Fighting between Sahel-based jihadist rivals spilled into Niger, as reported by Reuters on 9 April 2026. Reuters Those rivals clashed hundreds of times, resulting in more than 2,100 deaths, according to ACLED as cited in that reporting.
The broader context here is that the jihadist landscape no longer maps onto a single hierarchy or theatre. ACLED, in an expert comment titled '25 years after 9/11: al-Qaeda's most active affiliates today,' published 15 September 2026, examines how al-Qaeda has fragmented and no longer has one geographical centre 25 years after 9/11. ACLED That assessment arrived as the United States marked the 25th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks launched by al-Qaida against targets in Washington and New York. The Sahel data suggest the centre of operational tempo has shifted toward Africa, with affiliates capable of combined-arms style offensives and coordinated claims across borders.
Territorial control and expanding threat
ACLED has tracked a parallel change within the Islamic State's Sahel branch. In a report titled 'Newly restructured, the Islamic State in the Sahel aims for regional expansion,' ACLED examined the shift from mass violence toward territorial control and its future trajectory. ACLED A separate ACLED report titled 'Jihadist groups pose a growing and expanding threat in Africa' found Islamist militants are exerting growing military strength targeting state forces and civilians across several regions of Africa.
To understand why that distinction matters, think of the difference between a raid and an occupation. Mass-casualty raids punish and displace. Territorial control taxes, recruits and sustains. The April tactics in Mali, combining ambushes with car bombs, drones and raids on towns and garrisons, point toward groups seeking to hold ground and sever state lines of communication rather than simply demonstrate presence.
Looking at what this means for policymakers and analysts, three questions will shape the next phase. First, whether pressure toward Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Niger's exposure to both JNIM and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara produce a contiguous pressure zone across the three central Sahelian states, which consistently rank high on ACLED's Conflict Index due to high levels of violence. Second, whether the JNIM-FLA alignment endures beyond tactical convenience, given its demonstrated ability to overrun garrisons and force surrenders at places like Kidal. Third, whether intra-jihadist competition, already measured in hundreds of clashes and thousands of deaths, constrains expansion or pushes both networks to escalate attacks on states and civilians to secure resources and recruits.
In my view, the numbers for 2026 do not yet constitute a full-year total but already indicate a pace that would exceed the 2025 benchmark of 2,845 events. From 63 events in 2016, the decade-long rise has accelerated through combined offensives, inter-affiliate rivalry and a pivot toward territorial control.
