Two U.S. Bids for Sherritt's Cuba Mines Test Trump's Sanctions Plan
Two rival U.S. bids to buy out Canada's Sherritt International in Cuba are now before U.S. authorities, after Sherritt exited its nickel and cobalt mining joint venture with the Cuban state. The exit followed an executive order on Cuba-related sanctions signed by Donald Trump on 1 May 2026. The Guardian
One bid is associated with Ray Washburne, who was vice-chair of Trump's 2016 Victory Committee and organized the Republican Midterm Convention in Dallas in September 2026. The rival bid was submitted by Texas oil businessman Albert Huddleston for Sherritt's Cuba holdings. Both proposals are now under review. The Guardian
The holdings carry a legal overhang. Citigroup and Office Depot hold nine-figure claims, meaning claims worth hundreds of millions of dollars, tied to Sherritt's Cuba assets. These are certified property claims, formal U.S. findings that American property was taken in Cuba and compensation is owed. Any transfer must resolve those claims and obtain sanctions licenses, which complicates price and closing. The Guardian
The 1 May sanctions target persons, entities and affiliates that support Cuba's security apparatus or are complicit in corruption. Sanctions, in this case, are legal penalties that block trade, funds and business. The United States used that authority to sanction Cuban political and military leaders in May 2026. Reuters
A central tool reaches beyond U.S. borders. The executive order allows secondary sanctions, penalties on foreign firms that deal with sanctioned Cuban entities, even if those firms are not American. Like a choice between two markets, non-U.S. companies must weigh Cuba business against access to the U.S. financial system. Reuters
Sherritt is not alone in adjusting. Australia's Antilles Gold Ltd is seeking a U.S. buyer for its sanctioned Cuba gold mine after being blacklisted over its Cuba operation. The plan would place the asset under U.S. ownership to resolve the risk of being designated, or listed, for sanctions. The Guardian
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, described as the Trump administration's top expert on Latin America, is directing the pressure campaign. He told Axios in August 2026 there are "no escape valves" from the campaign against Cuba. Rubio said in 2015 he would roll back Barack Obama's Cuba policy. Axios
Washington has presented the measures as coercive statecraft, or the use of economic pressure to change another government's behavior. The U.S. government has called Cuba's government a national security threat and said sanctions are necessary to force a change in Cuba's government. Reuters
The Cuba drive follows upheaval in Venezuela. A U.S. military operation removed Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro from power and removed him from the country. Trump said the U.S. will "run" Venezuela after Maduro was captured. Maduro's fall removed Havana's principal external patron, or main outside supporter.
Cuba had depended on Venezuelan oil. Trump convened a 'Shield of Americas' summit with 12 Latin American participants in March 2026 and predicted Cuba is facing collapse after losing Venezuelan oil support. The loss of subsidized barrels, or cheap supplied oil, tightened fuel supply, power generation and foreign exchange.
The Guardian reported that Washington and Florida insiders, including Trump allies and Rubio-linked figures, are jockeying for control of Cuba's key assets and for business openings if the regime collapses. The contest over Sherritt's nickel and cobalt position is the first visible test of that positioning. The Guardian
The broader context here is how secondary sanctions turn a bilateral embargo into a divestiture pipeline. Foreign operators cannot easily keep joint ventures with Cuban state entities without risking U.S. designation. Sale to U.S. persons then requires licenses, claims resolution and political clearance. That sequence gives Washington leverage over who owns what next.
Looking at what to watch, three variables stand out. First, licensing precedent. Approval of either the Washburne or Huddleston structure would show how Treasury and State balance enforcement, claims settlement and political proximity. Second, replicability. An Antilles Gold buyer solution, if accepted, would offer a template for other sanctioned resource assets. Third, Havana's calculus. An asset transfer that keeps nickel, cobalt and gold flows under U.S.-approved control would deepen isolation without new designations.
In my view, the endgame language deserves caution. Predictions of collapse have accompanied Cuba policy for decades and have often outpaced institutional change on the island. What is verifiable now is narrower. Supply lines have shifted, legal risk has repriced foreign investment, and a small circle of U.S. political actors is seeking first-mover advantage on assets. Whether that produces transition, adaptation, or prolonged strain will depend on enforcement consistency, allied cooperation, and Havana's capacity to find alternative partners willing to absorb secondary-sanctions risk.
