Peters uses final speech to defend independent foreign policy and warn on costs
Winston Peters told the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Parliament that costs did occur as a result of New Zealand's nuclear-free policy.
It was his final speech as Foreign Minister, reported on 21 September 2026. He said he had run foreign policy in uncertainty's shadow since taking office in 2023, a phrase he returned to through the address, RNZ reported.
His main argument was about what an independent foreign policy means. Peters said it can never be unidirectional and must be multi-directional. In plain terms, New Zealand does not face one way only. Critics, he said, only count New Zealand as independent when it disagrees with the Americans. He criticised those who say New Zealand should always use megaphone diplomacy, or loud public criticism, especially against the United States.
He used history and recent decisions to make that point. Peters cited the anti-nuclear policy and the 2003 decision not to join the Iraq war as examples of disagreeing with the Americans. He cited New Zealand's decision on Palestinian statehood recognition as a more recent example where it differed from some of its closest partners.
He put a number on the effort. Peters said he made 44 offshore visits and spent 248 days overseas during his term. He said he held 279 meetings with foreign minister counterparts.
That pace, he said, reflects a staffing and funding problem. Peters said heavy travel would be the burden of any future foreign minister trying to make up for long term underinvestment in New Zealand's diplomatic network of embassies and posts. He also said the United Nations' ability to respond to crises was hamstrung by abuse of the Security Council veto, the power that lets its permanent members block action.
The address sits in a longer Institute sequence. In 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, New Zealand tasked senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials with assessing post-pandemic foreign policy challenges, according to a Beehive transcript of a 2024 annual lecture. That lecture period covered Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, and Hamas carrying out terrorist attacks on 7 October. It also covered New Zealand representatives meeting Ukrainian refugees during a visit to Warsaw, and attending the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting with bilateral meetings in Warsaw, Brussels and Stockholm.
The broader context here is how independence is tested in practice rather than in principle. Peters is drawing a line between public disagreement as proof of independence and a wider pattern of agreement and disagreement across different relationships. For staff inside the ministry and ministers around the Cabinet table, that distinction matters because it shapes instructions, talking points and appetite for risk.
Looking at what this means for the portfolio, the resourcing warning is the part a successor will feel first. If the network stays thin, presence has to be bought with ministerial travel. That affects workload, continuity in Wellington, and how the ministry ranks posts, cover for staff and work at international meetings. Where the Security Council cannot act, small states carry more of the load through coalitions, statements and targeted measures, all of which need staff time.
For the Press Gallery and for select committee scrutiny, where groups of MPs check government spending and decisions, the numbers now provide the baseline. Days offshore, visits made and counterpart meetings held are on the record for this tenure. Any debate about the next minister's travel, or about funding for the diplomatic network, will be measured against them.
