Colombia's presidential runoff on June 21, 2026, tests the country's security framework a decade after the 2016 Peace Accords officially ended the armed conflict with the FARC-EP. With incumbent Gustavo Petro barred from a second term, the next president will inherit a conflict landscape the accords reshaped but did not resolve.

The 2016 agreement established a settlement that seemed architecturally sound: disarmament of the FARC-EP guerrilla, rural reform, transitional justice mechanisms, and illicit crop substitution programs. But it fractured Colombian society from the beginning. A narrow "No" vote in the 2016 plebiscite — before Congress ratified the revised text — exposed how thin the consensus was. That division never healed.

The Structural Problem

The accords disarmed the FARC-EP but did not eliminate the economic systems it controlled: coca fields, extortion networks, and trafficking routes. When the guerrilla demobilized, dissident factions — breakaway FARC-EP commanders and later the Estado Mayor Central — moved to reclaim those resources. Meanwhile, the ELN expanded into territory the FARC-EP had left. Americas Quarterly reported in January 2026 that violence in rural regions partly stemmed from the power vacuum the demobilization itself created.

This dynamic mirrors other post-conflict settings. In Mozambique, South Sudan, and parts of the Sahel, armed groups fragmented rather than dissolved after peace deals. Colombia's version is more complex: some FARC-EP commanders rejected the accords and stayed armed, meaning the state never achieved a monopoly on force even immediately after the settlement.

What the Next Leader Faces

CFR's February 2026 report found that rising internal violence is a structural feature of the post-accords period, not a temporary phase. Rural areas in Chocó, Catatumbo, and the Pacific corridor have suffered the most displacement.

Petro pursued a "Total Peace" strategy — simultaneous talks with multiple armed groups. The approach produced temporary truces but no lasting settlements. Some collapsed under continued attacks. His successor faces a choice the Total Peace strategy tried to avoid: prioritize military force or negotiate exits, neither of which has delivered durable results alone.

The timing adds pressure. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) — the transitional justice court created by the accords — is processing cases involving thousands of ex-combatants and military personnel. Its work remains politically contested. If the new government distances itself from the accords or the JEP, it risks triggering re-armament clauses and straining the international guarantor framework that includes Norway, Cuba, and the UN.

Regionally, the stakes extend beyond Bogotá. Venezuela's border regions shelter armed groups, and Maduro's government has shown little willingness to cooperate on security. Ecuador has been drawn into spillover violence from Colombian organized crime. The next president's foreign policy — whether to engage Venezuela, seek U.S. counter-narcotics support, or build multilateral backing for peace — will ripple across the region.

The election itself does not solve these dilemmas. It determines who carries them and what coalition supports them. Colombia's conflict has outlasted many frameworks designed to end it. The 2016 accords remain the most ambitious attempt to date, yet gaps in enforcement and armed group fragmentation have kept them from delivering comprehensive peace. How the next government handles that inheritance — defending it, renegotiating it, or eroding it — will shape the country's security path for years to come.