CSIS has stepped up its operations against Iranian state-directed activity in Canada, according to The Globe and Mail, as the intelligence service deals with a threat picture that has become more complex since the U.S. and Israel engaged in direct military conflict with Iran.

Cthe Canadian security service's mandate includes four broad threat categories: espionage and sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion. Iranian operations often touch more than one of these at the same time, according to CSIS's 2024 public report. This overlap makes Iran a resource-intensive problem: a single network might run intelligence collection, intimidation campaigns against diaspora communities, and planning for direct action operations all under one command structure.

A significant shift in recent years, flagged in CSIS's 2024 report and highlighted by Global News in June 2025, is that Iran is deliberately handing off its campaigns of transnational repression — pressure on dissidents and diaspora members abroad — to organized crime groups. Rather than running these operations directly through intelligence officers working from embassies, the Iranian state contracts with criminal syndicates to surveil, harass, and sometimes physically threaten Iranian-Canadian communities. This outsourcing keeps the directing state's fingerprints off the operation while extending its reach well beyond what conventional espionage could achieve.

This outsourcing model itself is not brand new, but the degree to which Iran has made it systematic in Canada puts unusual pressure on CSIS. Countering it means working closely with the RCMP and provincial police, who handle organized crime cases. It also requires coordination with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre — a federal body that tracks suspicious financial flows — and allied intelligence partners in the Five Eyes alliance tracking the same networks internationally. Structurally, this is a harder investigative puzzle than a straightforward counter-espionage case against a known intelligence officer.

This expansion happens alongside a shift in public and political language. Since direct conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran intensified, CBC's investigative unit reported in March 2026, talk of Iranian "sleeper cells" inside Canada has increased — among politicians, in media coverage, and on social media. Intelligence professionals quoted in that reporting were careful in their assessment: the risk is genuine, but the rhetorical environment can amplify public worry in ways that sometimes push the service to be seen responding rather than simply responding effectively.

The difference matters in practice. CSIS operates under a reasonable-grounds-to-believe standard before opening or expanding an investigation, and any enforcement action requires either a court warrant or referral to police. If CSIS directed resources broadly at an entire community rather than at specific threat actors, it would invite legal challenges and damage the diaspora trust that itself forms a key intelligence asset. The Globe and Mail's reporting does not indicate this line has been crossed; the expansion appears focused on particular targets.

The broader context here is that Parliament is watching. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency both have standing authority to oversee CSIS operations, and Iranian-linked threats have featured in public reports from both bodies recently. Whether the increased operational tempo appears in the next public NSICOP annual report — or stays in a classified briefing that Parliamentarians see but the public does not — will signal how seriously the service assesses the current threat.

For Iranian-Canadians, the practical stakes are direct. Transnational repression campaigns aim to produce chilling effects: self-censorship, withdrawal from political involvement, and reluctance to deal with Canadian authorities. CSIS's ability to disrupt these campaigns before they turn violent protects not only national security but also the basic freedoms of speech and political participation that Canadian citizens hold. In this case, those two imperatives are not in tension — they align.