Yemen's Government Claims Key Gains Around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
Yemen's Saudi-backed government forces claimed on October 5, 2026 to have retaken the town of Dhubab and the port city of Mocha and to have secured effective control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The strait is the narrow waterway between Yemen and Djibouti where Red Sea shipping must pass, like a hallway all ships have to use. Control of its shores can affect global trade.
Information Minister Moammar al-Eryani told Reuters on October 5 that government forces had secured effective control of the strait, though fighting continued. Military and government sources cited the same day described the seizure of key positions on the strait and control of large parts of Dhubab district, which overlooks the waterway, including Dhubab's airport Reuters.
The claims form part of a wider offensive announced by Rashad al-Alimi, head of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council, to capture all territories lost to the Houthis. Government forces described the operation as a strategic offensive that includes a drive on the Houthi-held capital Sanaa and a northward advance along the Red Sea coast Al Jazeera.
The October 5 Saudi and Yemeni operation was presented as an effort to wrest control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Red Sea coast from the Houthis, an Iran-backed armed group in Yemen New York Times. The strait is a vital chokepoint, a narrow passage where trade routes narrow, for global trade CNN.
Airpower is central to the government's account of the push. A Saudi-led coalition said on October 5 that it had deployed 100 fighter jets to provide round-the-clock air support for the anti-Houthi offensive and that it had destroyed 324 high-value Houthi targets The National.
Government forces also said they were attempting to reverse Houthi gains around Taiz in southwestern Yemen. Houthi-run Al Masirah TV confirmed attacks linked to the strategic offensive on Sanaa, according to October 5 reporting.
Coastal push reverses September losses
After four years of relative calm, fighting flared again in July 2026. In early September 2026, Houthi forces launched a major offensive in Hodeidah and Taiz provinces aimed at advancing towards the Bab al-Mandeb strait Al Jazeera.
That offensive made sweeping gains along the Red Sea coast, including Mocha and Bab al-Mandeb. On September 10, forces loyal to Yemen's UN-recognised government and Houthi forces were fighting on multiple fronts to expand their control. By September 11, Al Jazeera reported that Houthi forces had captured the whole of Yemen's Red Sea coastline reaching to the Bab al-Mandeb shipping route.
The government's air arm was already active in the contested coastal corridor in mid-September. On September 13, a spokesperson for the government's armed forces said Yemen's Air Force had targeted Houthi vehicles in the Dhubab and Mocha areas.
Government sources described taking large parts of Dhubab district Al-Monitor, retaking Mocha, and moving north along the coast. Fighting continued at the time of the announcement. Independent verification was not available in the initial reporting.
Sanaa objective and the northern fronts
Alimi's announcement frames the campaign as a drive to retake all lost territory, with Sanaa as the declared endpoint. The Houthis have held Sanaa since September 2014.
Action was reported around Taiz as well as Dhubab, Mocha and Sanaa. Taiz sits astride inland routes linking the southwestern highlands to the coast and to approaches toward Sanaa. Government efforts there point to an attempt to prevent Houthi forces from linking the Red Sea coast and the interior.
The broader context here is one of competing claims and compressed timelines. The September sequence moved from multi-front engagements to a Houthi coastal sweep in a matter of days. The October sequence packs a counter-sweep, an air campaign of stated scale, and a capital offensive into a single announcement. The practical test is whether supply lines along the coast can be held under air cover.
In my view, three variables will shape what comes next. The first is durability of control around Dhubab and Mocha. Coastal positions can be counterattacked and need steady logistics. The second is the air campaign's tempo. One hundred aircraft and 324 claimed strikes indicate an intensive opening phase, but intensive phases do not by themselves secure ground. The third is Sanaa. Past cycles in Yemen point to the difficulty of turning coastal gains into movement toward the capital, where terrain, fortifications and political control favor the holder.
Looking at what this means for maritime risk, control of land overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb does not automatically make transit safe. The strait's significance lies in proximity. Artillery, missiles, mines and small-boat operations can affect shipping without holding both banks. Even partial contestation keeps insurers, navies and operators focused on the corridor.
For readers trying to weigh these early claims, skepticism is warranted on all casualty, territorial and strike figures until they can be corroborated. Both sides have incentives to project momentum. The government narrative stresses reclaimed towns, an airport, and effective control of the strait. The Houthi media acknowledgment of attacks around Sanaa confirms fighting, not the extent of government advances. The situation remains fluid.
