Why Online Searches Were Not Part of Biwei Zhang's NATO Security Check

Global Affairs Canada granted former federal public servant Biwei Zhang secret-level clearance before her NATO posting last year, after a security assessment by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and a criminal-record check by the RCMP.

Federal officials described that process to the House of Commons public safety committee. They said searches of internet profiles and social media were not required for "secret" clearance at Zhang's level. The levels work like tiers. "Secret" is the lower tier and did not call for an online review. "Top secret" is the higher tier and does.

NATO relies on member states to screen job applicants. NATO interns require "secret" clearance. NATO does not vet its own interns. The sponsoring state does, and Canada sponsored Zhang The Globe and Mail.

Zhang, 33, was identified by Belgian authorities as a Canadian national of Chinese origin. Her full name is Claire Biwei Zhang. She was working at NATO's command centre in Mons, Belgium, when she was arrested and detained in July. Belgian police arrested her in Mons on 24 July. She was a NATO intern arrested on espionage allegations. A CBC News investigation identified Zhang as the Canadian woman arrested on suspicion of spying at NATO CBC News.

Tara Denham, assistant deputy minister at Global Affairs, told MPs the department has started internet searches for its "secret" clearance checks since Zhang's arrest. Global Affairs recommended introducing internet searches to Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree. The recommendation followed his request that departments involved in Zhang's vetting review procedures after her arrest.

MPs also heard about limits on information sharing inside government. A public-service fraud finding would not necessarily have been shared with Global Affairs during vetting. There is no central government database storing federal employee "red flag" files.

Brigadier-General Liam Cox, director general defence security and chief security officer at the Department of National Defence, offered a caution about the value of such searches. He told the committee that trained spies would be unlikely to place compromising material online.

Canadian security agencies will probe the activities of Zhang in Canada The Globe and Mail.

The broader context here is that the testimony describes a clearance system operating as designed, rather than a failure to follow an existing rule. For a "secret" sponsorship, CSIS conducted a security assessment and the RCMP checked criminal records. Open-source review was absent because policy did not call for it. That leaves ministers and senior officials with a policy question, not a compliance question.

Looking at what this means for Ottawa, three pressure points stand out. The first is standardisation. Global Affairs has moved on its own to add internet searches and has advised the public safety minister to make that practice government-wide. The second is information flow. Without a central repository for employee misconduct findings, sponsoring departments depend on what originating departments choose or are permitted to share. The third is expectation management. Open-source checks may catch carelessness or inconsistency. They will not reliably catch a disciplined actor.

Looking ahead, the next phase for committee members will turn on documents and implementation. They will want to know what Anandasangaree decides, how any new search requirement is written, who conducts it, what sources count, and how results are retained and challenged under privacy and labour rules. They will also want to know whether allied partners reassess how they accept member-state assurances for junior but well-placed roles such as internships inside operational headquarters.