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Nintendo Ended Amazon Sales Over Pricing Pressure, Former Executive Reveals

Reggie Fils-Aimé revealed that Nintendo terminated its direct sales relationship with Amazon in the late 2000s after Amazon allegedly requested illegal financial subsidies to undercut Walmart's pricin

Martin HollowayPublished 4d ago5 min readBased on 5 sources
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Nintendo Ended Amazon Sales Over Pricing Pressure, Former Executive Reveals

Nintendo Ended Amazon Sales Over Pricing Pressure, Former Executive Reveals

Reggie Fils-Aimé, who led Nintendo of America for many years, recently disclosed that Nintendo stopped selling its products directly to Amazon in the late 2000s after an Amazon executive demanded what he calls illegal financial support. The goal was simple: Amazon wanted Nintendo to pay them money so Amazon could undercut Walmart's prices on Nintendo games and consoles.

Fils-Aimé explained the situation at an NYU Game Centre lecture. An Amazon representative asked Nintendo for an "obscene amount of support, financial support" to enable Amazon to sell Nintendo products cheaper than other retailers. The request went through multiple levels of Nintendo's sales team before landing on Fils-Aimé's desk as the final decision point.

The Conflict

Amazon essentially wanted Nintendo to subsidize lower prices at Amazon specifically. Fils-Aimé told the Amazon executive this would be illegal and would harm Nintendo's relationships with other major retailers like Walmart. When Amazon pushed back, Nintendo made its choice: stop selling Wii consoles and DS handheld systems to Amazon entirely.

This was not a small decision. Nintendo was selling ten million DS units every year in North America alone, and the Wii was at peak popularity. Walking away from Amazon's distribution network cost Nintendo real money.

Why This Mattered Legally

What Amazon asked for would break U.S. antitrust law. The Robinson-Patman Act prevents manufacturers from giving one retailer special pricing or financial deals that give that retailer an unfair advantage over competitors. Nintendo's legal team understood this risk clearly.

The Federal Trade Commission has spent decades enforcing these rules. Offering Amazon exclusive discounts designed to help it beat Walmart would have crossed that legal line.

Amazon's Business at the Time

The late 2000s were different for Amazon than today. The company was still aggressively expanding beyond books and electronics into general retail, and it did so by intentionally operating at losses to grab market share. Below-cost pricing—selling products for less than they cost—was standard Amazon strategy during that era. That's why the company was willing to ask Nintendo for direct subsidies to make the numbers work.

This wasn't unusual for the time. In the 1990s dot-com boom, venture capital-backed internet retailers routinely asked manufacturers and investors to fund unsustainable pricing just to build customer loyalty and market position before worrying about profit. Amazon followed a similar playbook as it expanded into new categories. Later, it applied the same logic to streaming video, smart speakers, and other product lines—essentially asking the entire supply chain to shoulder losses while Amazon built dominance.

How They Reconciled

Nintendo and Amazon stayed apart for several years, but by 2012, things had shifted. Nintendo announced that Wii U would integrate services from Amazon, Netflix, and Hulu Plus. The partnership was back on—but the structure had changed. Instead of haggling over Nintendo selling physical products through Amazon's retail store, the companies were collaborating on digital services built into Nintendo's hardware. That shift likely sidestepped the pricing pressure that had caused the original rupture.

What This Tells Us Today

The disclosure arrives at a moment when Amazon faces intense regulatory scrutiny over how it treats third-party sellers and retailers on its platform. Fils-Aimé's account sheds light on something that usually stays hidden: how these platform negotiations actually work when a manufacturer and giant retailer clash over terms.

The broader context here is worth understanding. Nintendo's choice—to protect pricing control even if it meant losing a major sales channel—reflects how established hardware makers think about antitrust risk differently than software or digital-services companies. A hardware manufacturer builds relationships with multiple retailers; losing distribution to one, while painful, is survivable. Agreeing to illegal pricing arrangements is not.

What Fils-Aimé shared is unusual. Most of these disputes end in quiet settlements or simply cease when companies stop working together, with nondisclosure agreements keeping the details private. Rare for anyone to say publicly what actually happened and why.

Nintendo has stuck with this philosophy ever since. The company has remained cautious about pricing arrangements when selling through major platforms, from app stores to subscription gaming services. That consistency suggests Nintendo's legal and business teams learned a lasting lesson in the late 2000s: market access can be rebuilt, but credibility and legal standing are harder to repair.

Nintendo Ended Amazon Sales Over Pricing Pressure, Former Executive Reveals | The Brief