FCC Blocks Two Devices Over the Chips Inside Them
The Federal Communications Commission has used a power it granted itself on October 13 to block equipment because of the silicon inside it, and it has done so for the first time against two products. Both contain what the agency calls “foreign surveillance chips,” and the FCC has barred them from being marketed or sold in the United States.
The new authority lets the commission block any gadget that contains a computer chip made by a company on its national security threat list. The earlier Covered List operated mainly at the level of the finished product and its maker. The chip-based provision reaches down to the component, meaning the processor inside the device. According to The Verge, the FCC did not identify the specific gadgets by brand or model. The commission's own announcement describes them as a dashboard camera and a wireless video transmitter, and states that they were prevented from being marketed or sold in the U.S. (FCC)
The chip at issue is the HiVision Hi3516CV610 UHD Smart Vision SoC. A system-on-chip (SoC) packages the core functions of a device onto a single piece of silicon. This one takes the raw output of a camera sensor and turns it into a working product, such as a home security camera or a dashcam. HiVision is a subsidiary of Huawei, which is on the FCC's Covered List of potential threats to national security. The FCC's reason for classifying the part as a surveillance chip rests largely on HiVision's own positioning. The company advertises the Hi3516CV610 as designed for the surveillance market, with built-in detection algorithms for human faces. (FCC supply chain filing)
The broader context here is the sequence of actions the commission has taken over the past year. In July, the FCC voted to bar sales of devices in the U.S. that contain key hardware from Chinese firms it considers risks. In September, Reuters reported that the Covered List had already been used to ban new Chinese drones, robots, routers, power inverters and other equipment, and that U.S. lawmakers had proposed reforms to the tool itself. (Reuters) On testing, the FCC's 2025 ban on testing U.S. electronics at labs owned or controlled by the Chinese government has now barred several dozen labs, according to Reuters reporting from October 7. (Reuters) Also in July, the FCC proposed prohibiting U.S. telecommunications carriers from interconnecting with Chinese telecom firms deemed national security risks. That proposal is still a proposal. (Reuters)
The legal question is contested. Dahua, the Chinese camera maker, has argued that the FCC lacks authority to expand import bans in this way, and has warned that the July proposal could block imports of devices previously authorized for U.S. markets. (Broadband Breakfast) Separately, the FCC's rules state that the commission will not issue new authorizations for telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company. (Congressional Research Service)
In my view, the component-level reach is the detail that matters most for engineering teams. A product maker that buys a commodity camera SoC from a third-party reference design has to know what is inside its bill of materials, not just who sells the finished unit. A dashcam or video transmitter can come from a domestic brand and still fall within the restriction if its silicon traces back to a listed company. Whether the agency and industry can build a practical way to verify that at the component level is an open question.
The FCC has so far used the power once. The lawmakers who proposed reforms to the Covered List process in September are the people most likely to shape how broadly the chip provision is read over time.
For the people who build and certify connected hardware, the immediate result is a clearer signal of where the boundary sits. The rules now have a specific technical hook: a named part, a named vendor, and a stated reason for classification. That gives engineers something concrete to design around, even if the compliance burden is heavier than it was.
