Scottish Hacker Sentenced to Six Years Over $11 Million Crypto Theft

A U.S. court has sentenced Tyler Buchanan, a 24-year-old from Dundee, Scotland, to six years in prison. He was accused of stealing at least $11 million in cryptocurrency from dozens of companies. TechCrunch reported the sentence on 18 November 2026.
The method was social engineering, which means manipulating people rather than breaking software. Buchanan's phishing attacks impersonated IT help desks, persuading employees to hand over their login credentials. The stolen access was then used to break into corporate systems and move cryptocurrency out of them. Buchanan was extradited to the United States in 2025. He is the fifth and final defendant to be sentenced in the U.S. case against members of the hacking groups.
The case was part of a wider prosecution. By late 2024, U.K. and U.S. authorities had indicted five hackers believed to be key members of the groups, and Buchanan was among them. The groups, known as 0ktapus, Lapsus$ and later Scattered Spider, had overlapping memberships. Buchanan and Arion Kurtaj were both connected to them.
Kurtaj, 21, is from Oxford, England. He has pleaded guilty to several cyberattacks he carried out as a teenager. Among them, he hacked Rockstar Games, the maker of Grand Theft Auto VI, in an operation involving data theft and extortion, and he leaked pre-release footage of the game. A U.K. court had earlier ordered that he be detained indefinitely after finding him unable to stand trial, citing his autism diagnosis and the high risk of hacking he posed to the public. U.K. authorities have since confirmed that he admitted to several hacks, including leaking the GTA VI footage, and that he will face a public trial.
The hacking continued while Kurtaj was under restriction. He carried out intrusions into companies while confined to a hotel under police protection, using an Amazon Fire TV stick, which breached his bail conditions.
In my view, the Fire TV stick detail deserves attention. A streaming device is an ordinary piece of hardware, sold to be plugged into a television, yet it was enough to reach the internet and carry out intrusions. Bail conditions and physical custody can restrict where a person goes, but they are poorly suited to controlling a network-connected device sitting in an ordinary living room. For security teams, the more durable lesson is that the attack surface includes every endpoint a person can log in from, not just the managed fleet.
The broader context here is the help desk. Impersonating IT support is an old social engineering technique, and it works because password resets and multi-factor enrolment are routine tasks that staff are trained to finish quickly. Organisations that rely on knowledge-based verification, where answers to personal questions count as proof of identity, give attackers a predictable path. Phishing-resistant authentication, such as hardware-bound credentials tied to a physical key, and out-of-band verification, which confirms a reset request through a separate channel, reduce that exposure. Neither removes the need for staff to recognise a convincing caller.
The sentencing matters mainly for what it shows about cross-border prosecution. Two defendants from Scotland and England were pursued through U.S. and U.K. processes that ran in parallel and ended in custody. The uncomfortable part is the timeline. The intrusions were committed by people who were, in Kurtaj's case, still teenagers, and in Buchanan's case, operating from abroad against companies with little visibility into the human side of the breach.
In my view, what the case makes possible, if its lesson is absorbed, is a more disciplined approach to identity. Help-desk verification, session revocation and monitoring for unusual cryptocurrency transfers are established controls. The arrests and sentences show that people who exploit weak versions of those controls can be identified and held to account, which gives enterprise security teams a useful baseline for their next round of hardening.


