Prime Minister Christopher Luxon's office has refused to release any documents — or even their titles — relating to advice he has received on grey-zone operations, citing national security.

The refusal came in response to an Official Information Act request from RNZ, which asked for the advice Luxon had received on grey-zone operations and a summary of any related work. The response confirmed that several documents fell within the scope of the request, but none would be released. RNZ

Grey-zone operations are hostile actions by states that fall short of outright warfare. A spokesperson for the Prime Minister pointed to sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea, and coercive maritime tactics disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, as examples.

Luxon first raised the grey-zone threat in a pre-Budget speech, where he placed it alongside cyber-attacks, disinformation, and supply chain coercion as tools countries use to pressure rivals. RNZ

In June, the government announced a concrete response: a 24/7 monitoring system for undersea telecommunications cables. If a vessel gets too close to a cable, the system triggers an alert and a warning. That announcement came before the OIA request was lodged and refused.

The OIA allows the government to withhold information for national security reasons under section 6(a). Officials regularly apply that section where releasing documents could reveal the scope of the advice ministers have received, or where the gaps might be. Refusing to confirm even the titles of the documents is a step further than withholding their contents. It means the public cannot see what questions were put to agencies, which agencies were asked, or when the advice was commissioned.

The broader context here is that Luxon's framing of grey-zone threats matters in its own right. By placing them alongside cyber-attacks and disinformation, he signalled that the government sees the threat picture as extending beyond conventional military and intelligence concerns into protecting infrastructure and countering maritime coercion. The undersea cable monitoring system is the only operational measure made public so far.

The examples the Prime Minister's spokesperson chose are also worth noting. Both the Baltic Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are places where Aotearoa has no direct military presence, but where disruptions carry global economic consequences. Pointing to those examples suggests the government is thinking about grey-zone threats in a global supply chain context, not just a domestic one — even though the only public response so far targets infrastructure in New Zealand's own waters.

What remains unknown is the substance of the advice Luxon has received, which agencies provided it, and whether any further initiatives beyond the cable monitoring system are being considered. The OIA refusal leaves those questions open, and there is no indication in the response of when or whether any of the withheld material might be revisited.