Angola Convicts Two Russians of Espionage and Terrorism, Testing Russia's Footprint in Africa

An Angolan court has convicted two Russian men of terrorism and spying, sentencing political consultant Igor Ratchin to 11 years in prison and translator Lev Lakshtanov to 8 years. The verdict, reported on July 23, 2026, The Guardian, closes a case that ties a domestic Angolan political crisis to the wider expansion of Russian covert influence operations across sub-Saharan Africa.
Angolan prosecutors accused Lakshtanov and Ratchin of planning a coup and helping organize the deadly protests that swept Angola in mid-2025. The two men denied the charges, saying they were in the country for cultural and business activities. Prosecutors said their goal was to shape Angola's next presidential elections, either by funding UNITA (the country's largest opposition party) or by pushing for a leadership change within the ruling MPLA.
To understand the stakes, a bit of history helps. The MPLA has governed Angola since the country won independence from Portugal in 1975. During Angola's civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 2002, the Soviet Union and Cuba backed the MPLA, while the United States and apartheid South Africa supported UNITA. President João Lourenço, in power since 2017, has reoriented Angola's foreign policy toward closer ties with the US and Europe. That pivot gives this case a geopolitical dimension that reaches well beyond Luanda, Angola's capital.
The protests at the heart of the prosecution's case began on July 12, 2025, when Angolan police fired rubber bullets and teargas at a peaceful demonstration against rising fuel prices. Human Rights Watch called the response "excessive force." Two weeks later, from July 28 to 30, a minibus taxi strike over fuel price hikes escalated into riots and looting. Official figures put the death toll at 22, with more than 1,600 people arrested. Angolan security forces faced accusations of firing live ammunition at protesters. The government defended its use of force as "progressive" and justified.
Prosecutors also claimed that Lakshtanov and Ratchin were connected to Africa Politology, a Russian disinformation and propaganda network that grew out of the Wagner mercenary group. (A mercenary group is a private military organization whose fighters are paid to operate in conflict zones, often on behalf of a government's interests.) According to reporting by The Guardian and an investigation by Forbidden Stories, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, known as the SVR, took control of Africa Politology after Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin died in 2023. The Wagner group itself was later rebranded as Africa Corps and absorbed into Russia's formal military structure.
That organizational history matters because it places the Angola case within a continent-wide pattern of Russian paramilitary and intelligence activity. The Wagner group, and later Africa Corps, has provided security for Central African Republic President Faustin-Arche Touadéra since 2017. In 2021, Wagner forces deployed to Mali in support of the military junta (a government that seized power by force). Africa Corps now backs military regimes in Niger and Burkina Faso. Since 2023, according to a US Congress report, Russian troops have been deployed in Equatorial Guinea, Libya, and Sudan. And in Madagascar, President Michael Randrianirina, who took power in a coup in October 2025, has significantly expanded ties with Moscow. Russians now serve in his presidential guard, and a weekly television program on Madagascar-Russia relations launched on national television in July 2026.
The broader context here is that the Luanda verdict is the first known case of an African government criminally prosecuting and convicting individuals whom prosecutors linked to the SVR's Africa Politology network. Other African states hosting Russian paramilitary or intelligence operatives have typically folded those actors into existing security structures or formalized bilateral arrangements. Angola's MPLA government, by contrast, treated the alleged network as a threat to its electoral sovereignty, despite the party's own Cold War-era ties to Moscow. The conviction also raises practical questions about whether other African governments managing Russian security partnerships will adjust their stance, or whether Angola's approach is an outlier shaped by its specific domestic crisis and Lourenço's Western-leaning foreign policy.
The case also exposes the institutional thread running from Wagner's covert operations under Prigozhin to the SVR's current portfolio. Africa Politology's alleged activities in Angola, funding opposition elements and seeking to force intra-party leadership changes, match what Western intelligence services have described as Moscow's broader strategy of cultivating political leverage across multiple African states at once, rather than betting on a single faction.
What remains unresolved is whether the convictions will prompt any formal diplomatic response from Moscow, and whether other African governments will follow Angola's lead in prosecuting rather than accommodating Russian operatives linked to influence networks on their territory.


