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Saudi Arabia's Oil Is Taking the Long Way Out — and It's Getting Expensive

Marcus SterlingPublished 2d ago7 min readBased on 19 sources
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Saudi Arabia's Oil Is Taking the Long Way Out — and It's Getting Expensive

Saudi Arabia began exporting crude through the Egyptian Mediterranean port of Sidi Kerir in July 2026, a longer and costlier route forced by the Houthi shutdown of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Saudi Aramco offered additional crude cargoes from Sidi Kerir after tankers diverted to Egypt when Iran-backed Houthis struck a vessel in the Red Sea, forcing a rapid reconfiguration of the kingdom's export logistics.

The route relies on the SUMED pipeline — a 200-mile conduit that moves crude from the Red Sea coast to the Mediterranean — to deliver oil to the Sidi Kerir terminal for export, particularly to European refiners. Some Saudi crude also reaches the Mediterranean on Suez Canal-compatible tankers without using the pipeline. Either way, the Mediterranean export route is lengthier and more expensive than the paths Saudi Arabia previously used. Fuel costs for oil tankers rerouting via the Suez Canal roughly double to approximately $2.87 million per journey.

The crisis compounds existing strain on Saudi logistics. Houthi forces shut down the Bab al-Mandeb strait, as reported in July 2026, and announced a blockade of Saudi ports. At least four tankers carrying Saudi crude reversed course before reaching the strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. Saudi crude loadings were cut roughly in half after the Houthi attacks, according to Kpler, a cargo-tracking analytics firm.

The pressure on the Red Sea route follows months of Saudi efforts to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely. Reuters reported on March 3, 2026 that Saudi Aramco was attempting to reroute some crude exports to the Red Sea to avoid Hormuz — the narrow channel between Iran and Oman through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil flows. Bloomberg's first report on the buildup, published ten days later on March 13, 2026, described a growing armada of oil supertankers off the kingdom's Red Sea coast. Yanbu emerged as the key Saudi Red Sea port used in the Hormuz bypass operation, with a large number of tankers waiting there to collect oil by mid-March 2026.

Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, described by Bloomberg in March 2026 as a vital release valve for global oil supplies amid Trump administration threats against Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, has a capacity of up to 2 million barrels per day. A Baker Institute working paper published in April 2026 identified Saudi Arabia and the UAE as having bypass options or workarounds for oil exports if the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted. Saudi Arabia exported around 5 million barrels per day from its west coast since March 2026, more than double prewar levels. The kingdom was considering expanding the capacity of its East-West crude oil pipeline to the Red Sea coast as of July 2026.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that Saudi Arabia's crude oil volumes transiting the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline declined by approximately 10% during the Red Sea disruption, as increased exports via the East-West pipeline and Red Sea ports partially offset the impact. Saudi Aramco stated in its Q1 2026 webcast that the market experienced an unprecedented supply loss of about a billion barrels of oil, partially offset mainly by alternative flows bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.

Aramco's maximum sustainable crude oil capacity (MSC) — the highest output the company can sustain for an extended period — is 12.0 million barrels per day, as stated in its 2025 Annual Report. Production from the Marjan crude oil increment, expected to come onstream in 2025, adds 300,000 barrels per day of production capacity.

The broader context here is a compounding chokepoint problem. Saudi Arabia first rerouted flows west to escape Hormuz, only to find its new exit corridor under threat from Houthi attacks. Each layer of rerouting adds cost and complexity. The Sidi Kerir workaround keeps crude moving to European refiners, but the elevated freight and operational costs compress netbacks — the price a producer actually receives after deducting transportation and other costs — for Saudi crude.

The consideration of expanding the East-West pipeline suggests Riyadh views the current 2 million barrel per day capacity as insufficient for a sustained dual-chokepoint scenario. For market participants, the key variable is whether the roughly 5 million barrels per day flowing from the west coast since March can hold if the Bab al-Mandeb remains shut. The halving of Saudi crude loadings after the Houthi attacks signals fragility. The 10% decline in Suez and SUMED volumes during the disruption, partially offset by pipeline throughput, indicates the system is absorbing stress but bending under it.

Looking at what this means for oil supply balances, Aramco's billion-barrel supply loss figure frames the scale of the disruption. The kingdom's 12.0 million barrel per day MSC and the added 300,000 from Marjan provide capacity buffers, but capacity is irrelevant if export routes are blocked. The cost structure has shifted. A $2.87 million fuel bill per Suez journey is a direct input cost. Saudi Arabia is absorbing the complexity of keeping its crude flowing through a corridor that is longer, pricier, and more exposed than the one it replaced.