Hungary's Tisza Government Nominates András Baka, a Judge Once Removed by Orban, for President
Hungary's governing Tisza party has nominated András Baka — a former Supreme Court chief whose dismissal by Viktor Orban's government in 2012 was later condemned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — as its candidate for the presidency. Prime Minister Peter Magyar announced the decision on Saturday, August 8, 2026, writing on Facebook that Tisza's parliamentary group had chosen Baka by secret ballot and calling it one of the most consequential decisions the party has made.
Baka, 73, is expected to be elected by the Hungarian parliament on the following Tuesday. Tisza holds a constitutional majority — meaning enough seats to pass laws and even amend the constitution on its own — following its landslide victory in April that ended Orban's 16-year rule. The Tisza parliamentary group posted the nomination on Facebook at 13:01 on August 8, hours after Magyar shared a joint photo with Baka that had already fueled speculation about the candidacy.
A Presidency Emptied by Constitutional Amendment
The nomination fills a presidency that Tisza itself emptied. The party used a constitutional amendment to remove Orban-era President Tamás Sulyok from office; Sulyok subsequently signed the law change that ended his own term, as reported by Reuters on July 18. The Hungarian think tank Political Capital noted that the presidential vote concerned the emptied presidential institution rather than Fidesz as such, and that Tisza's parliamentary group had agreed Baka's profile constituted the strongest guarantee for the office.
Baka's Career and the Dispute That Followed
Baka's career gives the choice its weight. Born in 1952 and living in Budapest, he served two terms as a judge on the ECHR in Strasbourg before being elected head of Hungary's Supreme Court (the Kúria) in 2009. Two years later, after he publicly criticized Orban's government reforms as a threat to judicial independence, Baka was removed from his post. The ECHR subsequently ruled that his dismissal violated his rights to a fair trial and freedom of expression — a judgment the Council of Europe said Hungary failed to fully implement.
The Orban government never accepted that ruling. Hungarian government statements maintained that Baka's human rights were not violated and that he was not restricted in stating his views. According to a 2019 government information note, Baka continued serving as a President of Chamber judge at the Kúria, and his judicial office was never terminated — only his executive office as Supreme Court president was. The 2014 government response to the ECHR decision said it would assess the ruling, but full implementation as demanded by the Council of Europe did not follow.
The nomination carries a layer of institutional symbolism that extends beyond the office itself. The Hungarian presidency carries mostly ceremonial powers, with limited authority to veto or refer legislation. Placing a figure whose removal became an international legal cause célèbre into the presidential seat serves as a tangible reversal of a specific Orban-era action that drew sustained European criticism.
Fidesz and Mi Hazánk Reject the Nomination
Fidesz, now in opposition, has rejected both the process and the nominee. The party said it would boycott the presidential vote, accusing Tisza of authoritarian tactics. Fidesz called the nomination an "illegal procedure" and characterized Baka as a puppet of the Tisza majority. The far-right Mi Hazánk party also rejected Baka's candidacy.
The broader context here is one of institutional turnover at speed. Tisza's April landslide did not merely replace a government; it provided the constitutional supermajority needed to restructure the presidency, remove an incumbent installed by the previous governing majority, and install a successor whose biography directly rebuts the judicial-independence record of the Orban years. The speed of these moves — from the April election through the constitutional amendment removing Sulyok to Baka's expected confirmation within days of nomination — reflects Tisza's capacity to execute an institutional agenda without negotiating across the aisle.
For Fidesz, the boycott and the "puppet" framing mirror the very criticisms that opposition and international actors directed at Orban's own consolidation of institutional control between 2010 and 2024. The accusation that a governing supermajority is using its parliamentary weight to install a compliant president is structurally identical to the critique leveled at Fidesz when it packed the Constitutional Court, the judiciary, and the presidency during its 16-year tenure. Whether Baka — a jurist with an ECHR-validated record of independence — fits the "puppet" characterization is a question the coming months may answer through his exercise of the office's limited but real veto and referral powers.
The parliamentary vote expected on Tuesday will confirm Baka's installation absent an unforeseen rupture within Tisza's ranks. With Fidesz and Mi Hazánk boycotting, the vote will proceed without opposition participation, completing a sequence that began with Tisza's electoral sweep in April and has now reached the presidency itself.
