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China's Rare Earth Controls: A Partial Truce, Persistent Bite

Elena MarquezPublished 5w ago4 min readBased on 14 sources
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China's Rare Earth Controls: A Partial Truce, Persistent Bite

A U.S. business group reported on June 10, 2026, that some critical minerals subject to China's export controls are now "nearly unobtainable" — a data point that cuts through the diplomatic language of recent weeks and captures where the supply chain actually stands.

The backstory is layered. China introduced export licensing requirements for medium and heavy rare earth elements in April 2025, a direct response to the tariff escalation initiated by the Trump administration. In October 2025, Beijing expanded the regime further, announcing sweeping controls that required any company worldwide to obtain a license if its products contained rare earth materials above a specified threshold. The Chinese government was careful to characterize the controls as a licensing regime, not an export ban — licenses would be granted for eligible applications. In practice, the distinction matters less than the throughput.

What followed was a sequence of suspensions, pauses, and partial rollbacks that gave manufacturers little certainty. Beijing paused its enhanced U.S.-focused licensing requirements for dual-use items including gallium through November 27, 2026. In April 2026, it suspended the October 9 controls outright until November 10, 2026. Then, following a Trump-Xi summit in May, China rolled back a wider set of restrictions — but left the April 2025 licensing requirements intact. The White House announced on May 18 that China had agreed to address U.S. concerns over rare earth shortages. Two days later, China's Ministry of Commerce confirmed it would cooperate on "reasonable" concerns — while reaffirming that the controls themselves are lawful.

That qualifier — "reasonable" — is doing considerable diplomatic work. The core April 2025 regime, the one tied to the original tariff retaliation, remains operative. Suspensions of the October expansion buy time but resolve nothing structurally. Supply chain planners dealing in dysprosium, terbium, or gallium cannot build procurement strategies around suspensions with expiry dates.

The multilateral dimension has been active but remains upstream of any concrete relief. The State Department convened a 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial in February, framing rare earths and critical minerals as foundational to AI, robotics, and advanced defense applications. The G-7 committed at that forum to move swiftly on supply diversification. In March, the State Department identified Africa as central to the Western competition for cobalt, copper, graphite, and rare earths. These are medium-to-long-horizon plays. The licensing bottleneck is immediate.

S&P Global flagged in January 2026 that rare earth supply bottlenecks were set to persist through the year, with prices for affected elements expected to rise. The June business-group report confirms that forecast was not overstated. For defense primes, EV manufacturers, and semiconductor fabs that depend on terbium-doped components or gallium-based wafers, the gap between diplomatic progress and operational reality is now measurable in production schedules.

The structural position has not changed: China controls the dominant share of global rare earth processing capacity — mining diversification in Australia, the U.S., and parts of Africa has not been matched by refining and separation capacity outside Chinese jurisdiction. That asymmetry is what makes the licensing mechanism effective as leverage, and it is why the April 2025 controls — even under a partial diplomatic thaw — continue to bite.

What the current moment looks like is a managed, time-limited standoff. Beijing has shown willingness to suspend the most expansive controls and to engage diplomatically, while preserving the legal architecture of the original regime. Washington has secured rhetorical commitments but not a dismantling. The November 2026 expiration dates on the current suspensions set the next decision point. How both governments approach that window — particularly against whatever tariff posture exists by then — will determine whether this partial truce holds or the controls snap back into full effect.