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China Launches WAICO, a 29-Nation Intergovernmental AI Body Headquartered in Shanghai

Elena MarquezPublished 5d ago5 min readBased on 8 sources
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China Launches WAICO, a 29-Nation Intergovernmental AI Body Headquartered in Shanghai

On July 16, 2026, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) was formally established as an inter-governmental body headquartered in Shanghai, with 29 founding member countries including Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa, Senegal, Russia, and Pakistan (Al Jazeera). The launch was timed to coincide with the opening ceremony of the 2026 World AI Conference (WAIC), held on July 17 in Shanghai, where Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote address (China State Council). UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres attended the launch event.

Xi's speech at WAIC laid out what Chinese state media termed "four observations" on AI development and governance (China State Council). He framed AI development as something that "should not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation" and called on countries to jointly oppose "overstretching the national security concept in the field of AI" (Al Jazeera). The latter phrasing directly targets export-control regimes and AI-related sanctions regimes maintained by the United States and its allies, though Xi did not name any country specifically. Xi also stressed a "people-centred" approach to AI, insisting that "AI is always under human control" (Al Jazeera).

In a concrete capacity-building pledge, Xi announced that China would provide 5,000 AI training opportunities for developing countries (China State Council). He also announced Beijing's intention to continue cooperating on AI with countries across Africa, Latin America, and Asia (Al Jazeera).

WAICO's institutional trajectory began at the 2025 World AI Conference in Shanghai, where China first proposed the organisation's creation (Reuters). That proposal itself built on the Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative that Xi put forward in 2023 (Xinhua). The 2026 launch formalises what had been a two-year diplomatic sequence: a conceptual framework, followed by a concrete organisational proposal, and finally an inter-governmental body with a physical headquarters and a defined membership.

The founding cohort of 29 members spans the Global South prominently. Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa, Senegal, Russia, and Pakistan are named among the founders; the full roster has not been enumerated in the available reporting. The geographic emphasis aligns with Xi's stated intention to deepen AI cooperation with Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Guterres's presence at the launch signals institutional engagement from the UN system, though WAICO is an inter-governmental organisation in its own right, not a UN specialised agency.

Xi's call to oppose "overstretching the national security concept" in AI is the speech's most pointed element. The phrase echoes language Beijing has used in multilateral forums to criticise US semiconductor export controls, chipmaking equipment restrictions, and allied efforts to restrict AI technology transfers. By embedding this critique within the founding charter of a new inter-governmental body, China positions WAICO as a counterweight to the technology-governance architecture being developed among US-aligned partners under frameworks such as the Bletchley and Seoul AI Safety Summit processes.

The 5,000-training-opportunities pledge functions as a tangible inducement for Global South participation. It mirrors the pattern China has used in other technological domains, from 5G infrastructure to satellite navigation, where capacity-building offers are bundled with standard-setting and governance forums that Beijing convenes or hosts.

Xi's "people-centred" and "human control" framing tracks with the governance principles articulated in the 2023 Global AI Governance Initiative, which emphasised fairness, non-discrimination, and sovereign discretion in AI regulation. WAICO's inter-governmental structure means that its policy outputs, standards recommendations, and governance frameworks will reflect the consensus of its 29 members rather than the narrower plurilateral groupings that have dominated AI governance discussions in OECD-aligned countries.

The broader context here is a bifurcating global AI governance landscape. WAICO emerges alongside, not within, the existing patchwork of G7-led initiatives, EU regulatory frameworks, and US executive actions on AI. With 29 founding members and a Shanghai headquarters, it gives institutional form to a competing governance pole, one that explicitly rejects the application of national-security-based technology restrictions and positions developing-country access to AI tools as a governance priority. Whether WAICO produces binding standards, facilitates technology transfer at scale, or remains primarily a declaratory platform will depend on the working structures, secretariat capacity, and budgetary commitments that the organisation now needs to establish. The founding documents have been signed; the institutional architecture is only beginning.

Looking ahead, the key variables are membership expansion, the depth of UN engagement beyond Guterres's attendance, and whether WAICO's governance outputs gain traction in standard-setting bodies like the ITU or ISO. The 29 founding members represent a bloc; whether that bloc grows or calcifies will determine whether WAICO becomes a consequential governance forum or another multilateral vehicle for declaratory diplomacy.