Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has described being pulled from rubble after a joint US-Israeli airstrike on 28 February 2026 that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, offering the most detailed first-person account to date of an operation that eliminated Iran's top leader and triggered a power struggle inside the country. Araghchi gave the interview to Iranian journalist Javad Mogouyi, published online on a Sunday and reported by The Guardian on 22 July 2026 (The Guardian).

Araghchi confirmed that Israel and the United States had accurate intelligence on the location of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials. The strikes began shortly after 9 am local time, timed to hit a gathering of senior officials from three key institutions: the ministry of intelligence, the strategic council on foreign policy, and the defence council. Araghchi was reporting to Ali Asghar Hijazi, Khamenei's deputy chief of staff, when three blasts shook the building within seconds. The third explosion struck right next to Hijazi's office and destroyed the left side of the building. Hijazi's secretary was killed instantly. Araghchi and Hijazi survived and climbed out through collapsed ceilings, walls, and rubble. Araghchi's official car had been hit, and a passerby rushed him to the foreign ministry.

The account raises serious questions about how much foreign intelligence agencies knew about Iran's inner workings. On 19 July 2026, three days before The Guardian's report, Araghchi told The Times of Israel that the intelligence breach had likely not been fixed and "probably still exists" (Times of Israel). This is a striking admission. Iran's security apparatus is built on keeping its top leaders' movements and locations secret. The foreign minister is effectively conceding that the same intelligence network that helped locate Khamenei may still be active and available to foreign spy services.

The diplomatic lead-up to the strike is equally significant. Araghchi confirmed that Iran had offered the United States a deal on its nuclear programme during the final round of talks in Geneva. Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi told Araghchi the day after those Geneva talks that the mood in Washington had become more bellicose. The timeline suggests that even as Iran was offering concessions at the negotiating table, Washington and Tel Aviv were either finalizing or carrying out plans for a strike aimed at taking out the supreme leader.

Iran's institutional response to the killing followed pre-drawn contingency plans. Araghchi disclosed that Tehran had prepared plans codenamed "Code 110" to close the Strait of Hormuz if the supreme leader was targeted. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which about a fifth of the world's oil supply travels. Think of it as a chokepoint: if Iran blocked it, global oil supplies would be disrupted and prices could spike. Such a move would almost certainly trigger a military response from the United States and its Gulf allies. Whether Iran has activated or will activate Code 110 remains one of the most consequential unanswered questions stemming from the February strike.

Succession was resolved within days. Al Jazeera reported on 1 March 2026 that Araghchi suggested a new supreme leader might be chosen within days, and Khamenei's son Mojtaba was ultimately appointed to the position (Al Jazeera). Araghchi said he had not yet met Mojtaba Khamenei in his new capacity but characterized the appointment as signaling "no change in regime policies." Araghchi also called the killing of Ali Khamenei "absolutely unprecedented and a major violation of international law."

Funeral processions were held around 2–3 July 2026. Reuters reported on 2 July that Iran warned the US and Israel against further attacks ahead of the processions (Reuters). On 3 July, Iran's president and Araghchi attended the funeral proceedings. By 25 March, Araghchi stated in an interview with Iranian state TV that his government had not engaged in any conversations with the United States since the strike (Associated Press).

The broader context here is a regime navigating three simultaneous crises: a leadership transition that handed power from father to son and could provoke internal opposition, an intelligence failure at the highest levels that appears to be ongoing, and the loss of the last diplomatic channel between Tehran and Washington. Araghchi's decision to speak publicly in such detail, five months after the strike, may reflect an effort to shape the story. By emphasizing that Iran was negotiating in good faith over its nuclear programme when the strike occurred, he frames the attack as a betrayal of diplomacy. By acknowledging the intelligence breach remains unpatched, he signals urgency to domestic security services. And by confirming that Code 110 exists, he reminds the US and Israel that Iran still has ways to escalate the conflict. What remains unclear is whether Mojtaba Khamenei's promise of "no change" will hold under the pressure of an unresolved intelligence compromise and an international community still absorbing the precedent set by the targeted killing of a sitting supreme leader.