President Donald Trump is asking Congress to approve a nuclear energy agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Reuters reported on July 22, 2026. If approved, the deal would let American companies help Saudi Arabia build nuclear power plants.

The deal is based on a part of U.S. law called Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. That section sets the rules for when and how the United States can share nuclear technology with another country. Think of it as a contract that says what the receiving country can and cannot do with the materials and know-how it gets from the U.S.

According to Reuters, which cited anonymous sources, the agreement leaves out a key oversight step. Specifically, it does not include a protocol — an extra layer of rules — from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA. The IAEA is the United Nations body that inspects nuclear facilities to make sure countries are using nuclear material for energy, not weapons. Democratic lawmakers had pushed for that oversight to be included, but the final version sent to Congress does not have it. Reuters first reported this gap in May 2026, and it remains in the submitted text.

The origins of the agreement go back to November 2025, when the White House published a fact sheet announcing that the two countries had signed a Joint Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation. The U.S. Department of Energy confirmed the deal that same day, with the U.S. Energy Secretary and Saudi Arabia's Energy Minister as signatories. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two governments was also published on the DOE website. A separate DOE article from May 2025 had already outlined areas of cooperation, including safety, security, and nonproliferation programs.

AP News reported that the agreement could potentially give Saudi Arabia the ability to enrich uranium. Enrichment is the process of concentrating uranium so it can fuel a nuclear reactor. At much higher concentrations, that same uranium can be used to build a weapon. That is why the question of enrichment is so sensitive. Under a 123 agreement, enrichment is only permitted under conditions that Congress and the president negotiate together. By leaving out the IAEA oversight protocol, the deal reduces the amount of outside checking that would happen.

The New York Times reported on July 21, 2026 that Trump separated the nuclear deal from any demand that Saudi Arabia recognize Israel. Previously, U.S. nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia had been linked to the larger effort to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. By pulling those two issues apart, the administration removed that connection. The Times also reported that the expected deal has raised concerns in Israel, where officials have long seen Saudi nuclear progress as a regional security issue. Those concerns are not new: in August 2020, the Times reported that U.S. intelligence agencies were already scrutinizing Saudi Arabia's efforts to build its ability to produce nuclear fuel.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, a 123 agreement must go before Congress for a review period. Congress can vote to block the agreement, but doing so requires clearing procedural and political hurdles. The pact's submission to Congress starts that review clock.

The broader context here is that Saudi Arabia has been trying for years to build its own nuclear energy capacity. The country's domestic electricity needs are growing, and its leaders say they want to rely less on oil and gas for power. Riyadh has looked for nuclear cooperation with several countries, but a deal with the United States is especially significant because it opens the door to American reactor technology and supply chains. For U.S. companies, the Saudi nuclear power market is a long-term business opportunity that could span decades.

The missing oversight piece, however, is where the deal's biggest risks come into focus. Right now, Saudi Arabia's inspection arrangement with the IAEA covers only one facility and does not include something called the Additional Protocol, which gives the agency broader rights to inspect sites. Without an IAEA protocol built into the 123 agreement, verifying that Saudi Arabia is keeping its commitments would fall to bilateral U.S.-Saudi channels rather than an independent international body. Critics in Congress are likely to ask whether those bilateral tools are strong enough to catch any attempt to redirect nuclear material toward a weapons program, especially given that Saudi Arabia has publicly expressed interest in matching Iran's enrichment capabilities.

Separating the nuclear deal from Israel normalization also changes the diplomatic picture. Previous U.S. administrations and outside analysts had seen the push for Saudi-Israeli normalization as a way to secure nonproliferation commitments. By splitting the two tracks, the administration has given up normalization as a bargaining chip and left the nuclear agreement to be judged on its own in Congress.

What Congress does next will determine whether the pact goes into effect. If no resolution to block it passes, the agreement takes effect. If lawmakers move to stop it, the administration would have to either renegotiate the terms or let the deal fall through. Either way, the outcome will affect not just the U.S.-Saudi relationship but the nuclear balance across the Gulf region.