Tāwhaki's dual-use dilemma: Who gets to launch to space from New Zealand?
The National Aerospace Centre (Tāwhaki) is writing a policy on what can and can't be launched to space from New Zealand. The joint venture between the Crown and local iwi has to decide how to handle launches for foreign military bodies — not just New Zealand's own Defence Force. RNZ
The policy would allow launches by the New Zealand Defence Force while putting requests from bodies like the US Pentagon through closer scrutiny, according to Tāwhaki chief executive John Holt. The framework asks four key questions: who the launch company is, what its credentials are, whether its values align with New Zealand's, and what is being launched. Those questions feed into existing obligations under New Zealand space law requiring payload disclosures — meaning details about what's going up must be declared. RNZ
Tāwhaki is on track to secure offshore investors to build a new spaceport at Kaitorete Spit, south of Christchurch, with customers to follow. The government has been inviting aerospace firms from around the world to set up at the site. RNZ Reuters
The governance structure makes the dual-use question particularly complex. "Dual-use" refers to technology that can serve both civilian and military purposes — for example, a satellite that provides weather data could also provide surveillance imagery. Tāwhaki's board is split 50/50 between Crown and rūnanga (tribal council) representatives, meaning any dual-use policy decision must go before both perspectives. Dr Matiu Prebble, Wairewa rūnanga chair and the rūnanga's representative on Tāwhaki's board, has stated plainly that "any kind of kinetic use of technology will not be supported by the rūnanga." Kinetic use means technology that causes physical damage or destruction. RNZ
Holt said the wider whānau was comfortable with NZDF launches for sovereign purposes, particularly national security, but less comfortable with weaponry or targeting others. The distinction between sovereign defence use and foreign military access is shaping up as the central fault line. RNZ
Within the rūnanga itself, the call is being pushed further. Wairewa rūnanga members Wiki Martin and Dr Alvina Edwards planned to call for a hard line against any militarisation or weaponisation at a regular rūnanga meeting. Dr Edwards cited reports of satellite imagery being used in the Gaza war as galvanising her stance against militarised technology on Kaitorete Spit. RNZ
The regulatory backdrop has shifted substantially. Parliament passed legislation on 23 July 2025 to regulate ground-based space infrastructure, closing a gap that had existed as launch activity expanded. Reuters In February 2026, the permitted number of space launches was increased from 100 to 1,000, signalling government intent to scale the industry. DLA Piper The Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act (OSHAA) remains the primary statute, regulating launches, launch facilities, space payloads and high-altitude activities. MBIE
The policy portfolio has changed hands. Paul Goldsmith has taken over as space minister following Chris Penk's resignation. RNZ
Submissions to New Zealand's Space Policy Review, which helped shape the current policy environment, foreshadowed the tensions now surfacing at Tāwhaki. One submission argued the government should never allow any payload to be launched from New Zealand that could facilitate the command and control of nuclear weapons. Another argued that New Zealand should not permit launches of payloads belonging to foreign military forces, to preserve sovereignty over its interactions with space. A third urged that New Zealand's space objectives should include preventing launches that contribute to climate change or produce space junk, and preventing an international space-force race. MBIE MBIE MBIE An MBIE Cabinet paper has also noted that establishing a space launch industry in New Zealand has the potential to create national security and foreign relations benefits. MBIE
The broader context here is a governance model that deliberately embeds iwi decision-making at the board level rather than consulting after the fact. With a 50/50 Crown-rūnanga split, Tāwhaki's dual-use policy cannot be settled by ministerial direction alone. The rūnanga's position on kinetic technology sets a firm floor that any prospective foreign military customer would have to clear, and the gap between "sovereign national security" and "weaponry or targeting others" is where the hard negotiations will sit. That gap is not abstract. Satellite imagery, communications relay, and positioning data all sit on the dual-use spectrum, and partner nations may not always distinguish between their sovereign defence needs and offensive operations in the way New Zealand's domestic politics demands.
The policy also lands in a Parliament that has already moved to expand launch capacity tenfold and regulate ground infrastructure. The legislative signals point toward growth; the governance structure at Tāwhaki points toward constraint on who benefits from that growth. Reconciling those two directions is the substantive task ahead for Holt, the board, and the new minister.
