Al Carns, who stepped down as Minister for the Armed Forces on 12 June 2026, has now spoken publicly about what he saw inside the Ministry of Defence: waste and inefficiency he describes as "unbelievable." More specifically, he was frustrated by the MoD's refusal to kill off old defence programmes even when they were draining money and delivering poor results.

Carns left office the same day Defence Secretary John Healey resigned. His departure letter made clear he believed the government's defence investment plan was "neither transformative enough." When he spoke again on 16 June 2026, his criticism became sharper — adding weight to a row that had already removed two of the ministry's most senior officials within hours.

The real argument is not about spending more or less, but about where the money goes. The UK committed in its 2025 Strategic Defence Review to reach 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027 — moved up from a 2030 target — with plans to reach 3% later. The National Audit Office expects MoD spending to rise 12% through 2028-29. The Commons Library reports an average annual real-terms growth of 3.6% in the department's budget since 2023-24. By standard measures, the funding is going up.

Carns' complaint cuts deeper. He argues the spending increases are being squandered from inside the system. The problem he identifies is a well-known trap in defence procurement: when programmes cost more than planned and deliver less than promised, officials keep funding them anyway because cancelling them would mean admitting past mistakes and facing political backlash. The result is that money meant for new capabilities gets consumed by ageing programmes that should have been retired long ago.

This critique carries weight because of who makes it. Carns is a decorated combat veteran with a DSO, OBE, and MC to his name. He served as Minister for Veterans and People from July 2024 before moving to the Armed Forces portfolio. He is not a politician playing tough for the cameras; he is a former military officer who understands what it costs operationally when forces lack modern equipment. When someone with that background calls something "unbelievable," it is not casual complaint.

The twin resignations reveal a tension that runs through NATO defence planning right now. Countries announce big spending increases, but many struggle to translate money into actual military capability. It is straightforward to commit to 3% of GDP on defence. It is far harder to make the difficult calls: closing programmes that employ voters in swing districts, admitting that money spent on old projects is simply lost, replacing platforms that have become politically entrenched. Governments typically flinch at those choices.

What the new defence team does next will show whether Carns' warning actually changes how the MoD works, or whether it amounts to a prophecy that goes unheeded. The 12% spending increase provides political shelter. By itself, it does not rebuild the military or introduce genuine change.

For those tracking UK defence closely — industry figures, researchers, MPs — the resignation of a senior minister specifically over the speed and quality of reform rather than over budget cuts sends a signal worth noting. It suggests the central pressure point in UK defence has shifted. The problem is no longer primarily how much money the Treasury allocates. It is whether the Defence Ministry can reorganise itself to spend what it receives well.