Iran Claims Hormuz Strikes Forced U.S. Pullback as Oil Flow Recovers
Iran claimed on September 28, 2026 that its attacks on commercial ships and U.S. Navy vessels near the Strait of Hormuz forced Washington to move warships farther from the Iranian coast. The claim, carried by Iranian state-linked outlets and senior officials, frames recent missile strikes as successful sea denial (making an area too risky for an opponent to use). Washington disagrees. Al Jazeera
U.S. media reported on September 27 that eight U.S. Marines suffered smoke inhalation and possible traumatic brain injuries on September 14 after an Iranian anti-ship cruise missile attack in the Strait. A cruise missile flies low to strike ships. U.S. officials quoted in those reports said the Marines were not on a U.S. Navy ship. U.S. Central Command had earlier said U.S. vessels evaded Iranian ballistic missile attacks (missiles that travel high and fall fast) earlier in September.
The Pentagon added 29 U.S. sailors and eight Marines to its war-wounded list after those incidents. That brings the total since the war began on February 28 to 861 service members. At least 19 deaths of U.S. service members had been recorded in the same period.
Tehran pointed to the casualties and ship movements to support its claim. Iranian state-linked media claimed U.S. warships pulled back from blockade positions near Chabahar and the entrance to the Gulf of Oman to the central Arabian Sea to avoid Iranian missiles. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said in a message published September 28 that U.S. forces were refraining from advancing further because of blows suffered from fighters and guardians of the Strait of Hormuz.
Contested control
The operational picture on September 28 remained disputed. The United States continued to maintain a naval blockade of Iran's southern ports while rejecting Iran's latest proposal for reopening the Strait. A blockade uses warships to prevent shipping to and from ports. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps insisted the Strait remains closed to vessels that do not coordinate passage with Iranian authorities. The U.S. military moved considerably more energy shipments through the Strait in the weeks before September 28, though the waterway remained far from its pre-war unimpeded state.
Both sides describe control in incompatible terms. For Tehran, coordination means permission. For Washington, escort means access. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in September remarks that every day more barrels of oil are flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, and that the only blockade in the Strait of Hormuz is the one the United States has imposed on Iran. U.S. State Department
Iran points to a longer list of grievances. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement regarding a U.S. violation of a ceasefire (a temporary halt to fighting) in acts it said took place in the late hours of Thursday night, May 7, and the early hours of Friday morning, May 8. In June it condemned U.S. aggression against an Iranian oil tanker telecommunications tower in Qeshm. Mediators were trying to facilitate more talks as of September 28, while Washington signaled faith in its pressure tactics.
Oil flows and risk pricing
Preliminary data put crude exports through the Strait on course to average 7.4 million barrels per day in September. That would be a clear increase from August, when Kpler estimated flows averaged around 4.3 million barrels per day. Reuters
The weekly pattern is uneven. Reuters reported on September 25 that crude flows out of the Strait had reached 33.7 million barrels so far that week. Shipping data reported September 21 showed 17 commodity vessels transited over the weekend, down from 37 a week earlier. Satellite and tracker data reported September 22 showed Saudi oil moving through the Strait averaged about 2.9 million barrels per day over the prior six days.
Oil prices slid about 2% on September 25 as the U.S. and Iran explored a path out of war. Goldman Sachs had warned earlier in September that oil prices may rally as high as $120 a barrel if attacks on shipping rise.
The broader context here is a dual campaign. Iran is using limited strikes to raise the cost of sailing close and to assert a consent regime for transit, like demanding approval slips. The United States is using distant blockade and escorted convoys to sustain flows while denying revenue to southern Iranian ports. Each side can point to metrics in its favor. Tehran cites injuries, damage, and repositioning. Washington cites rising barrel counts.
Looking at what this means for managing escalation, the September 14 cruise missile incident matters more than the rhetoric around it. Smoke inhalation and possible brain injuries among embarked Marines on a non-Navy hull raise questions about force protection, rules of engagement, and the legal status of auxiliary and commercial platforms under escort. The addition of 37 names to the wounded list in one update also keeps domestic pressure visible in Washington, even as officials stress evasion of ballistic threats and continued throughput.
For energy planners looking ahead, the gap between 7.4 million barrels per day in preliminary September data and a normal baseline leaves little margin. Single-digit daily transits on some days, intermittent missile fire, and competing closure declarations sustain war-risk premiums, the extra insurance costs for sailing in danger. If mediators open another round, the sequencing will likely center on coordination procedures in the Strait and relief or tightening of the southern ports blockade. Until then, Hormuz functions as both chokepoint and bargaining table.
