Rafael Mariano Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has confirmed that nuclear inspections in Iran will continue. But he also made something clear: the agency still cannot access the facilities that were hit by U.S. airstrikes — and those are the sites that matter most for understanding Iran's nuclear program.

This announcement comes as the inspection situation enters a new phase. In September 2025, the IAEA and Iran agreed to restart inspections at multiple locations, including some that had been bombed, according to Reuters. The agreement followed weeks of urgent back-and-forth diplomacy, and Grossi had warned just before that time was running out for a deal. It was meant to restore inspections after they had been severely disrupted. But by January 2026, the situation had changed. Grossi told Reuters that inspectors had visited all the sites in Iran that had not been bombed, but the bombed facilities — almost certainly Iran's most sensitive nuclear enrichment locations — remained sealed off. "The standoff cannot go on forever," he said.

The timeline of events matters here. On June 20, 2025, Grossi briefed the UN Security Council about Iran's nuclear situation — an unusual step that signaled the IAEA's Board of Governors was concerned. A week earlier, the Board had passed a resolution urging Iran to cooperate with inspections. These resolutions don't have legal force to punish anyone, but they create an official record and apply diplomatic pressure. Iran has learned to respond carefully to such resolutions: it offers some cooperation while keeping leverage over its most sensitive facilities.

Why Access to the Bombed Sites Matters

The bombed sites are not minor details — they are central to the whole inspection problem. Under international nuclear treaty rules (specifically the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran's Additional Protocol, which has been suspended and partially restored through various agreements), the IAEA's job is to provide credible proof that nuclear material hasn't been diverted or misused. This assurance relies on continuity of knowledge: if inspectors can't see what a facility looked like before it was struck, they can't figure out what was destroyed and — most importantly — what may have been moved away before or during the strikes.

This is the technical puzzle that Grossi is trying to solve. The inspections that have resumed give the IAEA a partial picture. Think of it like trying to audit a company's finances when you can't see the main ledger — the missing piece changes what you can actually verify. For countries and international bodies that use IAEA reports to decide whether to maintain sanctions, control exports of nuclear equipment, or shift their diplomatic approach, this gap is a serious problem.

Iran has treated access to bombed sites as a separate negotiation track from broader inspection resumption. This approach lets Iran show some compliance on less sensitive facilities while keeping control over the sites inspectors really want to see. The IAEA faces its own dilemma: if it certifies that inspections are working based on partial access, it risks credibility. It cannot say it has verified Iran's program when it hasn't actually seen the most important parts.

Where Things Stand Now

As of late June 2026, Grossi's public statements are that inspections will proceed and that how to conduct them is still being worked out. This language suggests the two sides are still negotiating rather than executing a final plan. In January 2026, Reuters reported that inspections of non-bombed sites had finished; what's left is whether Iran will allow access to the struck facilities and, crucially, how inspectors would assess a site that has been physically altered or destroyed — something the IAEA hasn't had to deal with much before.

The IAEA's Board of Governors will track whether current negotiations lead to concrete timelines for accessing the bombed sites. The June 2025 resolution is on record, and if Iran continues to refuse access, the Board could refer the matter back to the UN Security Council. But this is uncertain — not all Security Council powers agree on how strongly to push Iran on this issue.

Iran faces a complex calculation. The bombed sites mean more to Tehran than just nuclear policy — they represent a violation of its sovereignty and, in any negotiation, a bargaining chip. If the IAEA gains full access, that leverage disappears. Right now, the IAEA needs access more urgently than Iran needs to grant it. That imbalance has set the pace of this entire process.

When Grossi says publicly that this standoff cannot last forever, he is naming a real institutional problem. The IAEA has no enforcement power — it cannot impose sanctions or military action. What it has is credibility. Every month the agency cannot inspect the key sites, its assessments about Iran's program lose value. That matters for every country trying to understand what Iran's nuclear intentions are.