Somalia Says No to an Israeli Base in Berbera

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Al Jazeera in an interview published on October 3, 2026, that Somalia will not accept an Israeli presence "under any circumstances." It was Mogadishu's bluntest public rejection to date of any Israeli military or administrative footprint on territory it claims as sovereign. Al Jazeera

Mohamud said Israel planned to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city's airport. He said Israel's real aim was to get closer to the Gulf states and Iran. In the remarks as reported, he did not give evidence for that plan or a timeline, and Israel was not quoted.

He described Israel as a "destabilising force" that does not abide by international law. International law here means the rules that govern how states act toward each other. He criticised Israel's recognition of Somaliland in December, which Al Jazeera's October 3 article describes as having occurred last year. That recognition is the central legal and political dispute. Mogadishu considers Somaliland part of Somalia. No country other than Israel recognises Somaliland as independent.

Berbera is a port city on the Gulf of Aden coast in Somaliland, near the Bab al-Mandeb strait facing Yemen. The strait is the narrow southern entrance to the Red Sea. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Control and use rights in Berbera link four issues: sovereignty — who has the legal right to rule — recognition, maritime access, and naval positioning at that entrance.

Mohamud also told Al Jazeera the United States remains Somalia's strongest partner in the fight against "terrorism." That followed a concrete offer. In March 2025, Somalia offered the United States exclusive control of air bases and ports, including air bases in Balidogle and Berbera as well as the ports of Berbera and Bosaso. Reuters

On internal security, Mohamud told Al Jazeera that al-Shabab, the armed Islamist group fighting the Somali government, has no presence in Somalia's major cities. That claim is about territorial control in urban centers, not the group's overall capacity. As reported, he did not extend the assessment to rural areas or to how often attacks happen.

On the Horn, Mohamud told Al Jazeera that Somalia's relations with Ethiopia are good and Mogadishu does not object to Ethiopia gaining access to the sea through Somali territory. Sea access for landlocked Ethiopia, a country with no coastline, has been a persistent source of friction in the region. The phrase through Somali territory preserves Mogadishu's claim that it must give consent.

On the Red Sea, Mohamud accused Yemen's Houthis, an armed movement in Yemen, of "destabilising" the region and disrupting navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb strait. He told Al Jazeera that attempts to pull Somalia into Middle East crises will not succeed. Al Jazeera

The broader context here is a sovereignty bargain playing out on several fronts at once. Mogadishu is asserting exclusive authority to grant or deny foreign basing, while offering Washington privileged access, accommodating Ethiopian maritime needs under Somali consent, and rejecting an Israeli role tied to Somaliland recognition.

Looking at what this means for outside powers, Berbera concentrates the tradeoffs. A Gulf of Aden port near Bab al-Mandeb offers leverage over interdiction, resupply, intelligence collection, and freedom of navigation. It also invites counterpressure. Any permanent presence linked to a contested recognition decision raises the political cost for others considering commercial or security use of the same facilities.

In my view, the questions to watch are contractual and operational rather than rhetorical. Who signs access agreements for Berbera, who controls the airport and port perimeters, and which navy or air force actually deploys there will settle more than communiques.