Sudan's Army Claims Al-Mazroub: Why This Kordofan Town Matters

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) said on Oct. 4 its soldiers had captured the town of al-Mazroub in North Kordofan after fierce fighting with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The claim was reported in an Al Jazeera analysis of whether the army is gaining momentum, which describes al-Mazroub as one of the RSF's most important positions in North Kordofan. Mohamed Deidan, spokesman for the army's special forces, told Anadolu news agency the army had taken full control of the town.

Deidan said al-Mazroub links army-controlled North Kordofan with West Kordofan, which he identified as an RSF stronghold, or heavily defended base area. He called its capture an important step to cut RSF supply lines, the roads and routes used to move fighters, fuel and weapons. The SAF has pushed the RSF out of much of North Kordofan state, increasing pressure on RSF positions and supply routes.

Control across Sudan is still split. The SAF controls Khartoum and most of northern, eastern and central Sudan, while the RSF controls almost all of Darfur and parts of Kordofan. South Kordofan remains contested, while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a separate armed group, holds pockets of territory in the south and controls parts of South Kordofan.

Sudan's civil war erupted in April 2023 in Khartoum after tensions between the SAF, the regular national army, and the RSF, a powerful paramilitary rival. The conflict has expanded to 13 of Sudan's 18 states and displaced 14 million people. Fighting across Kordofan intensified since late 2025 after the RSF captured el-Fasher, the army's last major stronghold in Darfur. That capture in October 2025 cemented its control over Darfur.

Kordofan sits between Darfur and central Sudan, acting like a corridor that connects the west to the center. It has seen one in five recorded attacks in Sudan's war, according to an Al Jazeera corridor assessment published Oct. 1. El Fasher is the capital of North Darfur.

A second front was active in Blue Nile state. The army's Fourth Infantry Division claimed its troops inflicted heavy losses in lives and equipment on the RSF and SPLM-N in the Minza and Bashkarkad areas. Blue Nile Governor Ahmed al-Omda Badi said the RSF launched drone attacks on the governor's house and the aircraft were intercepted by air defences.

On diplomacy, documents cited in July 2026 showed a U.S. peace plan for Sudan called for limited RSF withdrawals prioritising North Darfur and North Kordofan. On July 9, 2026, Sudan's army said it would only accept a U.S. peace plan that called for full RSF withdrawal from cities, according to Reuters. In November 2025, an RSF leader said any place where the army is present is a legitimate target and that the RSF would attack in Kordofan, Khartoum, or Port Sudan. On Sept. 24, 2026, Reuters reported Sudan's RSF had intensified deadly drone attacks on government-held frontline cities.

The broader context here is a reversal in narrative, not yet a settled reversal in force. On Nov. 28, 2025, Al Jazeera reported momentum was with the RSF and warned of partition risk after its push toward Kordofan. By Jan. 12, 2026, the army was renewing efforts for an operation to retake Kordofan and Darfur. On Jan. 27, the military said it had broken a nearly two-year RSF siege, a long blockade of a town, on a key town in Kordofan. An Aug. 10 assessment asked whether the army had turned the page on control of western Sudan.

In my view, Kordofan explains why both sides treat towns like al-Mazroub as operational hinges. The side that holds lines of communication through North and West Kordofan shapes resupply into Darfur and force projection toward the center. Drone strikes on administrative targets and frontline cities fit that logic. They extend reach without requiring ground advances.

Looking at what this means for the next phase, three variables will test whether the SAF advance holds. The first is sustainment along extended supply lines westward. The second is coordination between the RSF and SPLM-N in contested zones such as Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The third is whether external mediation can bridge the gap between limited withdrawals and full urban withdrawal. None is resolved. The map still favors fragmentation.