African Union Facilitators Push Congo Peace Plan in Kigali as Fighting Continues

African Union facilitators held consultations in Kigali on October 6 to push forward the peace process for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo while fighting continued in the east. Al Jazeera The agenda centered on carrying out the Washington Peace Agreement, security arrangements, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters, refugee protection and regional economic cooperation.
The delegation included former Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and former Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi. Sahle-Work Zewde serves as deputy chairperson of the AU Panel of Facilitators for the eastern DRC peace process.
The Kigali meetings followed a stop in Goma on October 5. There, the facilitators met representatives of MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, OCHA, the UN office that coordinates humanitarian aid, ICRC, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus, a joint team that checks ceasefire violations, and the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement, known as AFC/M23.
The broader context here helps explain the order of travel. Goma put the panel in direct contact with peacekeepers, aid groups and the verification team, as well as with AFC/M23, before the panel engaged Rwanda's capital. After Goma, the panel called for respect for ceasefire commitments, promises to stop fighting, cooperation with verification mechanisms and restraint from actions that could undermine the peace process. Fighting has not stopped.
In Kigali, the facilitators held separate consultations with Rwandan officials and representatives of regional institutions. The discussions covered security commitments, protection of refugees and returnees, and regional economic cooperation including mineral traceability, systems to track where minerals come from, cross-border trade, energy and infrastructure.
The broader picture here is why economics sat with security. The pairing of security commitments with traceability, trade, energy and infrastructure keeps the economic track inside the security discussion, not next to it.
The facilitators said they would continue engagements in Kinshasa to support dialogue and advance the peace process.
In practical terms, the itinerary shows who must be involved. The route from Goma to Kigali to Kinshasa follows the structure of the mediation itself, which must work across the Congolese government, Rwanda and AFC/M23, alongside international and regional mechanisms.
The Washington Peace Agreement was signed by the DRC and Rwanda on June 27, 2025. The DRC and Rwanda later agreed to start implementing security measures under the U.S.-mediated deal in October 2025. Reuters At a June 2026 meeting of the agreement's Joint Oversight Committee, the parties expressed concern over escalating fighting and called for full implementation including commitments concerning the FDLR and disengagement of forces.
A second track runs through Doha. The Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on November 15, 2025 by representatives of the Congolese government and AFC/M23 under Qatar's mediation. The Washington agreement deals with relations and security commitments between the DRC and Rwanda, while the Doha process addresses negotiations between the Congolese government and AFC/M23.
Positions on who is to blame remain opposed. Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of supporting AFC/M23, an allegation Kigali denies. Rwanda accuses the Congolese government of supporting and arming the FDLR. Rwanda-backed M23 rebels entered the eastern Congolese town of Uvira near the Burundian border, according to December 2025 reporting. Reuters Rwanda later blamed Congolese and Burundian forces for renewed fighting in eastern Congo. Reuters
Looking ahead to what will test the mediation, the question is less whether more commitments are signed and more whether verification, disengagement and DDR, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, move forward together on both tracks. Like referees checking a game, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus, ceasefire commitments and calls for restraint point to that timing problem. So does the inclusion of refugee protection alongside mineral traceability and cross-border trade. For those following closely, the near-term signs to watch are cooperation with verification, handling of FDLR-related commitments and force disengagement under Washington, and whether the Doha channel between Kinshasa and AFC/M23 produces reciprocal restraint that holds in North and South Kivu.


