New Zealand troops detonated two ground drones during Exercise Black Prince 3 near Adelaide, even as an Official Information Act request shows the Defence Force has no command directives covering how such systems are to be used.

A joint Anzac battlegroup used small uncrewed ground vehicles — Jaeger UGVs — each loaded with 50 kilograms of high explosives, and detonated them in a simulated attack on an enemy position. The Australian Defence Force called the demonstration a "powerful" showcase of increased lethality.

But behind the exercise lies a governance gap. The NZDF's OIA response confirms it is still working through operational, training and workforce requirements for drones. An overarching "concept" for robotic and autonomous systems is not due until December, pending further trials. Some rules exist for training, safety and use of aerial drones over land, but nothing equivalent exists for ground systems or weaponised platforms like those used at Black Prince. The Force has spent roughly a million dollars on drone-related equipment in the past year.

For anyone familiar with how militaries introduce new weapons systems, the absence of a command directive is the more significant fact here. Former Major General John Howard said operating a system without clear direction puts risk on both the field operators and the senior leadership approving its use. A directive exists to give "absolute clarity" about how a weapons system enters service — what it can be used for, under what authority, and with what constraints. Its absence does not stop units training with equipment, as Black Prince shows, but it leaves commanders making judgment calls in a space where policy should provide boundaries.

This is not a new problem. Rhys Jones, Chief of Defence until 2014, was already discussing strike drones with colleagues over a decade ago. He argues New Zealand needs to move rapidly, settling guidance, capability choices, organisational structure and training "very quickly" rather than one step at a time. Josh Wineera, a former lieutenant colonel now working as a drone consultant, put the same point plainly: institutional thinking is lagging the technology, and has been for some time.

The practical effect is that budgets at working level are constrained and units are left uncertain whether robotic systems are a genuine capability requirement or a discretionary add-on. That distinction matters for procurement planning, force structure reviews, and anyone trying to make the case internally for sustained investment rather than one-off exercise participation. Without a directive settling the question, drone spending sits exposed to the next round of budget prioritisation in a way that a formally mandated capability would not.

Yet none of this stopped New Zealand personnel taking part in one of the more overt lethality demonstrations the ADF has run in this space. Black Prince has become one of the venues where Australia and New Zealand test combined arms concepts alongside emerging uncrewed systems. The presence of Kiwi troops in the battlegroup indicates the two forces are experimenting jointly even where their respective policy settings differ. Australia's framing of the exercise as evidence of "increased lethality" suggests the ADF treats these platforms as an operational line of effort rather than an open question.

The December concept document will be the point at which NZDF has to show its workings — whether that document actually resolves the operational, training and workforce questions flagged in the OIA response, or whether it becomes another staging point in a process that has stretched well past a decade of internal discussion. Given Jones's account of talks going back to his own tenure, the gap between capability enthusiasm and settled doctrine has already outlasted several defence reviews. Whether the December paper closes that gap, or simply restates the problem in policy language, is the thing worth watching.