Yemen's Houthi group said on July 28, 2026, that it fired several ballistic missiles at the Saudi oil tanker NCC GHAZAL as it crossed the Red Sea, forcing the vessel to turn back. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced the strike on X, saying the tanker was targeted for breaking the group's ban on Saudi ships and had ignored warning calls before the missiles were launched (Detroit News; Al Jazeera).

The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), a monitoring body that tracks shipping safety incidents, reported that a tanker experienced an explosion in the Red Sea. The crew was safe and no environmental damage was recorded, according to UKMTO's account as cited by Al Jazeera.

The strike on the NCC GHAZAL is the third confirmed attack on Saudi shipping since the Houthis declared a naval blockade on Saudi vessels in the Red Sea on July 20, 2026. A blockade is an attempt to prevent ships from entering or leaving a specific area. On July 22, Saree said the group attacked two other Saudi oil tankers, the Encelia and the Layla, using missiles and drones for violating the blockade. The Saudi Press Agency confirmed that the Encelia was hit, citing a Saudi Transport General Authority official who said all crew members were safe (Al Jazeera; Reuters Connect).

The Houthis have also attacked Saudi oil installations in two ports along the Red Sea coast, widening the campaign beyond commercial shipping to energy infrastructure (Reuters). Ship traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb strait has declined following those attacks, according to data reported by Reuters on July 27.

The Bab al-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is about 29 kilometers (18 miles) wide at its narrowest point. In 2024, approximately 4.1 billion barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products passed through this chokepoint, a narrow passage that ships must use to move between bodies of water. That volume represented roughly 5 percent of the global total. Any sustained disruption to traffic through this corridor carries direct consequences for energy supply chains linking Gulf producers to European and North American markets (Al Jazeera).

Oil prices have already moved in response. International oil prices topped $100 a barrel amid the Houthi escalation and the broader conflict involving Iran, and prices surged following the initial attacks on Saudi tankers (AP News; Reuters).

The US military launched new strikes on Iran as clashes escalated in the Strait of Hormuz region, and President Donald Trump vowed to punish Iran for the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, directly linking the Houthi maritime campaign to the broader US-Iran confrontation (AP News; Reuters).

The broader context here is a deliberate Houthi strategy of step-by-step escalation. The blockade declaration on July 20 was followed within 48 hours by strikes on two vessels, then by attacks on Saudi port infrastructure, and now by a third tanker engagement. The group's stated reason for targeting these ships, violation of a declared maritime ban, gives each strike an appearance of enforcement rather than random attack. That framing complicates the legal and diplomatic justification for any military response. The pattern also mirrors the Houthis' earlier Red Sea campaign targeting Israel-linked shipping, where declared exclusions were used to legitimize strikes and deter insurers and shipping operators.

The connection the US administration has drawn between Houthi actions and Iran matters for how this escalates. By framing the maritime blockade as an Iranian-backed campaign rather than a localized Yemeni conflict, Washington has positioned military strikes on Iran as a proportional response to Red Sea disruptions. That framing, combined with simultaneous clashes in the Strait of Hormuz, means the Red Sea and the Gulf are now operating as linked theaters in a single US-Iran confrontation rather than separate flashpoints.

For shipping operators and energy traders, the key question is whether the decline in Bab al-Mandeb transit hardens into a sustained rerouting of ships. The data already shows traffic dropping. If insurers raise war-risk premiums for Saudi-flagged or Saudi-owned vessels, the higher costs could push those tankers onto longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, tightening available fleet capacity and pushing freight rates upward independently of the crude price increases already triggered by the geopolitical risk.