Russia fired 115 drones and 24 ballistic missiles at Ukraine in an overnight attack around August 5, 2026, killing 21 people and injuring dozens BBC News. The Ukrainian Air Force said it did not intercept a single one of the 24 ballistic missiles. It also failed to stop any of the four Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles Russia used in the same strike The New York Times Reuters.

Ukraine did far better against the drones, shooting down nearly 90% of the 115 launched Reuters. But that lopsided result is not new. In a July 29 attack, Ukrainian forces shot down 55 missiles and 265 drones but intercepted only one of nine ballistic missiles Reuters. An earlier overnight strike on Kyiv in August saw Russia launch 27 ballistic missiles; Ukraine intercepted one Al Jazeera. Reuters separately reported that Russian missile strikes across Ukraine in early August killed 17 people Reuters.

The reason Ukraine cannot stop ballistic missiles comes down to supplies, not strategy. Ballistic missiles are extremely fast weapons that travel in a high arc and then plunge toward their target. To shoot one down, defenders need specialized interceptor missiles, typically fired by systems like the American-made Patriot. Ukraine says deliveries of those interceptors have dropped to a third of what they received in 2025 Reuters. Drones, by contrast, are slower and easier to shoot down with a wider range of weapons. When interceptors for ballistic missiles run low, no amount of drone kills can make up the difference.

The Zircon missiles used in the August 5 attack add even more pressure. Hypersonic weapons travel so fast that defenders have only seconds to react. Think of it like a goalkeeper facing a penalty kick: if the ball moves fast enough, even a perfectly positioned keeper cannot reach it in time. Ukraine confirmed it intercepted none of the four Zircon missiles fired. When Russia launches ballistic and hypersonic weapons together in one attack, Ukraine is forced to choose which threats to even attempt to stop.

On the ground, the human cost is mounting. Anastasiia Dudley, whose home near Kyiv was significantly damaged in the attack, described it as the "scariest night" of the war BBC News. BBC journalist Dan Johnson visited the site to report on the destruction firsthand BBC News.

The broader context here is that Ukraine is running low on the very tools it needs to defend itself. Interceptor deliveries at one-third of 2025 levels, set against Russian attacks that combine large numbers of drones with fast, precise ballistic and hypersonic missiles, point to a widening gap between what Ukraine's air defence system was built to handle and what it can sustain right now. The high drone interception rate, while impressive on its own, hides the fact that the deadliest weapons in each Russian attack are now getting through almost untouched.

The pattern across three documented attacks in late July and early August is the same each time: Ukraine stops almost all the drones but almost none of the ballistic missiles. If interceptor deliveries do not recover, the approach Russia seems to be taking is simple to describe. First, flood the skies with drones to overload Ukraine's radar and attention. Then send in the ballistic and hypersonic missiles that Ukraine cannot meaningfully stop. Each new attack sharpens that playbook against a defender with less and less capacity to disrupt it.