Iran is deliberately dragging out negotiations with the United States so the conflict stays unresolved through the November midterm elections, according to The Guardian on August 7, 2026. The goal is to make the war a political liability for President Donald Trump, similar to how the 1979–81 hostage crisis — when Iran held 52 Americans for over a year — helped sink President Jimmy Carter's reelection chances.

The plan came into focus through comments by Iranian deputy foreign minister Kazem Gharibabadi. He told Iran's official news agency, IRNA, that the second phase of nuclear negotiations would take two to four months — but only after the two sides agree on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which about a fifth of the world's oil flows. That timeline alone pushes talks right up to the November vote. Gharibabadi said the original plan to start the nuclear phase within 30 days of signing a June agreement with the US had been scrapped by the Trump administration. He then listed several steps that must happen first: lifting sanctions (penalties that cut Iran off from international trade), ending the US blockade of Iranian ports, unfreezing Iranian assets held abroad, and new promises not to attack each other. Together, these steps could take well beyond the midterms (The Guardian).

Iranian media have been openly watching Trump's falling approval ratings, blaming the drop on the war's unpopularity and rising oil prices. Mehr News, an outlet close to Iran's Revolutionary Guards (a powerful military force separate from the regular army), put it bluntly: continuing the war increases pressure on Trump, while backing down would look like retreat to his supporters. The outlet concluded the war will be decided at the ballot box, not the battlefield, with consequences for US policy for years (The Guardian).

The hostility toward Trump is personal and rooted in a long list of grievances. According to The Guardian, Iranian officials have distrusted the US since the 1979 Islamic revolution, and that distrust is now aimed squarely at Trump. He pulled out of the 2018 nuclear deal, ordered the killing of top Iranian general Qassem Suleimani, entered nuclear negotiations with Iran twice only to launch wars, and showed no remorse for the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or the attempt on the life of President Masoud Pezeshkian. At Khamenei's funeral, calls for revenge were everywhere, and many Iranians see punishing Trump as a war goal in itself (The Guardian).

Trump's own statements have bounced between hopeful and frustrated. On August 6, Reuters quoted him saying negotiations were "moving along very nicely," raising expectations the five-month war might end soon. Two days earlier, on August 3, he said the Strait of Hormuz could reopen "by tomorrow" and that direct talks would begin that Monday, with Pakistan and Qatar mediating (The Guardian; Reuters via Facebook). In late July, he said the two countries were "in negotiations right now" and suggested Iran wanted a peace deal (Reuters via Facebook). Yet back on May 27, Trump accused Iran of stalling to run out the clock before the midterms (The Guardian).

The gap between Trump's public optimism and his private complaint that Iran is stalling matches what outside analysts see as a deliberate Iranian plan. Jason Brodsky of United Against a Nuclear Iran said Tehran has no interest in giving Trump a quiet period before the elections and will keep "playing games," making further cycles of conflict over the strait likely (The Guardian).

The negotiation history has been uneven. In mid-May, Reuters reported Trump had paused an attack on Iran and signaled a nuclear deal might be possible, with an Iranian offer sent through Pakistan focused on ending the war and reopening the strait (Reuters). By May 29, Reuters described an emerging framework deal that showed Trump's dilemma, with one proposed term being to leave the nuclear issue for a future president (Reuters). On March 31, Trump said the war's main goals were nearly done and that US-Israeli strikes had prevented Iran from getting nuclear weapons, while adding that US forces could return with "spot hits" (Reuters). In early March, after Khamenei's assassination, Trump said he was willing to talk to Iran's remaining leaders. Congress was divided on the war, with the Senate preparing to vote on a Democratic resolution to end it that Republicans were expected to block (The Guardian; The Guardian).

The broader context here is that Iran's slowdown serves several purposes at once. It gives Iran time to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and the release of its frozen money in a way that maximizes its leverage at every step. It keeps the Strait of Hormuz as a tool Iran can tighten or loosen to pressure the US. And it forces Trump to campaign for the midterms while carrying the cost of an unresolved, expensive war, with high oil prices adding to voters' frustration. The historical comparison Iran has invoked — the hostage crisis that helped defeat Carter — suggests Tehran sees election-year pressure on the sitting president not as a side effect of talks, but as the main way to win concessions.

There is a catch, though. A July 18 Guardian analysis warned that Iran's gamble could push Trump to raise the stakes even higher, making further escalation, including a ground invasion, more likely (The Guardian). The analysis suggested that while Iran's strategy is designed to wear down Trump, it also leaves him less room to step back without looking like he is surrendering. Both sides are now stuck in a situation where each has more reason to keep the pressure on than to make a deal — and the months between now and November give neither side a clear path to claim victory without the other giving up something it has built its entire strategy around keeping.