Vietnam Is Building Islands in the South China Sea. Here's Why That Matters

Vietnam has ramped up its efforts to expand islands and reclaim land in the South China Sea since 2024. This marks a major turn in a long-running competition between countries over control of this crucial waterway. To understand what's happening now, you need to know what came before.

What Is the South China Sea Dispute?

The South China Sea contains valuable fishing grounds and potential oil and gas reserves. Several countries claim parts of it, including Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and others. These claims overlap, creating tension that has simmered for decades.

China Started the Intense Building Campaign

Beginning around 2013, China began an aggressive program of land reclamation—turning shallow reefs into artificial islands and bases. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China created roughly five square miles of new land on seven disputed sites in the Spratly Islands.

The scale was remarkable. At its peak, China reclaimed about 1,500 acres in a single year. China built military facilities including a runway 3,000 meters long (nearly two miles). What had been barren reefs became military outposts capable of projecting Chinese power across the waterway.

China's government announced that some of these projects were complete and that it had stopped the reclamation work. Yet satellite imagery and analysis showed that China kept building despite these public statements. This pattern—saying one thing publicly while continuing construction—created friction with other countries in the region and with the United States.

President Barack Obama called the land reclamation "counterproductive" and urged China to stop. The Philippines formally protested. Other Southeast Asian neighbors grew anxious about China's expanding presence.

How China Uses These Islands

The islands are not empty. According to the 2021 U.S. Department of Defense report on China's military, these outposts now house advanced weapons and support regular military operations. China stations navy ships, coast guard vessels, and civilian boats in these areas. This presence effectively blocks rival claimants from fishing or exploring for oil and gas.

Experts call this a "gray-zone" strategy—China asserts control without firing shots. It stays below the level of armed conflict but achieves practical control through sheer presence.

These islands also serve a larger strategic purpose. China's nuclear-powered submarines that carry nuclear weapons operate from Yulin Navy Base on Hainan Island. The South China Sea islands provide forward positions that could protect this critical military asset.

Now Vietnam Is Following the Same Path

Vietnam has accelerated its own island-building and land reclamation efforts since 2024. This is significant because it mirrors what China did a decade ago, but in a very different context.

When China was building, regional acceptance of such activities was higher, and the practice was less clearly tied to military buildup. Vietnam is now building in an environment where everyone knows that land reclamation means militarization and territorial control.

This shift reveals something about how Vietnam's leaders are thinking. They have tried diplomacy and protests. They have relied on international mechanisms to solve the dispute. But these approaches have not stopped China's expansion. So Vietnam appears to have decided that the only way to strengthen its claims is to build physical presence on the ground—facts that cannot be ignored.

This is a familiar pattern in territorial disputes. One country restrains itself while another expands. Eventually, restraint starts to look like a losing strategy, so other countries begin to expand too. We have seen this happen before in the 1990s when China built on Mischief Reef and the Philippines protested, only to watch as Chinese building spread to more and more features until it became the norm.

What This Means for Peace and Stability

The broader context here is troubling. As long as the basic sovereignty disputes remain unsolved—as long as no one agrees who owns what—countries will keep using land reclamation as a tool to strengthen their claims. Legal arguments do not always matter if you control the territory physically.

Vietnam's acceleration also raises a concern about escalation. If Vietnam is building more, the Philippines and other claimants might follow suit. This could trigger a competitive spiral where everyone rushes to build and fortify their claims. Such competition makes it harder to manage tensions through agreements and increases the risk that an accident or miscalculation could spark conflict.

The real challenge is that there is no easy path forward. As long as these territorial disputes remain unresolved, claimants will see land reclamation and construction as necessary defense of their positions. Vietnam's decision to accelerate mirrors the logic that has driven Chinese behavior for over a decade: if you do not assert control through physical presence, you fall behind.

The question now is whether countries can manage this competition without letting it spin into direct confrontation, while also working toward longer-term solutions that address the underlying disputes about who owns what.