Iran Threatens to Shut Down All Gulf Oil Routes If Countries Join US Economic Pressure
On August 22, 2026, a top Iranian security official warned that any country joining the United States' "economic war" against Iran would face severe retaliation — including a threat that "not even a drop of oil" would leave the Gulf region by any export route. Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, delivered the warning through Iran's IRIB state broadcaster, one day after US President Donald Trump announced what he called the "most crushing economic operation" yet against Tehran Al Jazeera.
The threat broadens the confrontation beyond the US-Iran dispute that has defined the conflict since it began on February 28, 2026. Rezaei described a three-stage retaliation strategy: first, diplomatic engagement with countries cooperating with Washington; second, if they do not step aside, direct strikes on their interests. "We will strike. We will target that country's interests," he said. Any country imposing economic restrictions on Iran, in his words, "will be regarded as an enemy."
The most consequential part of Rezaei's warning concerns oil export routes. Iran has already imposed a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway that in peacetime carries roughly a fifth of global oil and gas exports. That blockade has served as leverage in negotiations with Washington. Rezaei's threat to target alternative export routes beyond Hormuz likely points to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has used that route to export its oil since the Hormuz blockade began.
The US economic measures, announced by Trump on August 20, 2026, were paired with explicit pressure on third countries. Trump pledged "tremendous economic consequences" for any country giving Iran "any type of lifeline." Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent struck the same binary note: "You're either with us or against us." Bessent specifically urged cooperation from China, which purchases more than 80 percent of Iran's oil shipments.
On August 23, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian escalated the rhetorical framing in a televised speech, declaring that Iran is in a "full-scale economic, military and security war" with the United States.
The US maintains military facilities across more than a dozen locations in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, with thousands of soldiers stationed across the region, including in Jordan. Iran has attacked US military installations and civilian locations since the conflict's onset in late February. According to Iran's own accounts, it has launched nearly a hundred waves of retaliatory strikes under the banner of "Operation True Promise 4," targeting American and Israeli positions IRNA. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — Iran's elite military force — has separately vowed "severe, crushing" retaliation for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh and what Iranian state media termed "the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution" IRNA.
The US justification for its military and economic campaign has included the assertion that Tehran was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons. That claim was debunked by US intelligence agencies and the UN's IAEA nuclear watchdog, the international body that monitors compliance with nuclear agreements. That finding undercut a central pillar of the administration's case for maximum pressure.
The structural pressures on Gulf states are acute. Iran's naval blockade has already disrupted free trade in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, according to Iranian statements IRNA. Countries hosting US bases now face simultaneous pressure from Washington to enforce sanctions — economic penalties that cut a country off from international trade — and from Tehran to abstain. The IRGC has warned that any threat to Iran's security will trigger "an unprecedented and devastating response" IRNA.
The broader context here is a deliberate Iranian strategy to widen the cost calculus beyond Washington. By threatening not only Hormuz but alternative export corridors like Bab al-Mandeb, Tehran is signaling that it can hold Gulf oil infrastructure hostage across multiple maritime chokepoints at once. Think of it as a single country controlling the toll booths on several major highways simultaneously — the leverage multiplies with each route threatened.
For Gulf states weighing compliance with US sanctions, the trade-off is stark: cooperation with Washington invites direct Iranian retaliation against national assets; non-cooperation risks exposure to US secondary sanctions (sanctions applied to third parties that continue trading with the targeted country) and the economic consequences Trump and Bessent have promised. China's role is pivotal. With Beijing absorbing over 80 percent of Iranian oil exports, Bessent's direct appeal suggests Washington recognizes that the economic pressure campaign cannot succeed without Chinese enforcement, or at minimum Chinese acquiescence. Whether Beijing will prioritize its energy relationship with Tehran over its broader strategic relationship with Washington is the decision that will largely determine whether the "most crushing" sanctions achieve their intended effect.
The threat to Bab al-Mandeb also implicates the maritime security corridor in the Red Sea, where shipping has already been disrupted by Houthi activity allied with Iran's regional network. A simultaneous blockade of both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb would affect roughly a quarter or more of seaborne oil trade, with cascading effects on insurance markets, freight rates, and global supply chains. For regional actors, the three-stage escalation framework Rezaei outlined provides a narrow diplomatic off-ramp, but it is conditional on explicit withdrawal from the US-led economic campaign.
