The Democratic Republic of Congo filed a case against Rwanda at the International Court of Justice on 26 June 2024, bringing decades of regional conflict into the UN's principal judicial arena. Kinshasa accuses Kigali of violating international treaties on genocide prevention, racial discrimination, discrimination against women, and torture. Reuters reports the filing; AP confirms the case centers on Rwanda's role in prolonged eastern Congo violence.

The case, formally titled Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), is procedurally separate from an earlier 2002 case between the same parties — which the Court dismissed in 2006 for lack of jurisdiction. Both cases rest on similar ground: cross-border military support, armed groups operating across borders, and control of eastern provinces. The new filing reflects Congo's belief that anchoring claims in multilateral treaties — especially the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture — will overcome the jurisdictional obstacles that derailed the 2002 case.

This strategic choice is consequential. The ICJ cannot simply intervene in all inter-state disputes; it can only hear cases when both parties have agreed to its authority, typically through specific treaty language. By framing its grievances through conventions Rwanda has ratified, Congo is constructing a narrower but more defensible legal path than before. The Court's first major decision will be whether this jurisdictional foundation holds — likely at a preliminary objections phase before examining the case's merits.

Proceedings have begun moving. Oral arguments in a related phase were scheduled for 24 to 26 November 2025 at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Separately, Congo filed written observations on 17 March 2025 in another genocide-related case at the ICJ, suggesting Kinshasa is pursuing multiple legal channels simultaneously.

The conflict underlying the case has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions since the 1990s. Rwanda's documented support for the M23 rebel group — denied by Kigali but recorded in UN investigative reports — is central to Congo's complaint. By treating that support as a treaty breach rather than merely an armed incursion, Congo gains legal tools that general international law would not provide. The Genocide Convention, for example, requires states to prevent genocide, not just refrain from committing it themselves; Congo's argument appears to suggest Rwanda's conduct in eastern Congo triggers those affirmative obligations.

Before Congo filed its application, Belgium's UN envoy publicly called for exactly this step in April 2024, urging Kinshasa to bring the matter before the ICJ. Congo followed through roughly two months later. This reflects how the legal strategy was being actively weighed in diplomatic circles beforehand.

The broader context here is instructive. Treaty-based inter-state cases are proliferating at the ICJ — Ukraine v. Russia, South Africa v. Israel, and others — where states are using court proceedings as both legal claims and diplomatic leverage. ICJ cases move slowly; a final ruling, if Congo's case clears jurisdictional hurdles, lies years ahead. However, provisional measures — relief the Court can order within months — carry real weight: even without enforcement mechanisms, a judicial order directing Rwanda to halt certain conduct would extract diplomatic and reputational costs.

Rwanda's response at the preliminary objections phase will determine whether this case becomes a genuine accountability mechanism or stalls at the threshold, as happened in 2002. What differs now is the treaty architecture Congo is invoking and two decades of ICJ judgments on the Genocide Convention's scope, especially Bosnia v. Serbia and Gambia v. Myanmar. Kinshasa's legal team will be drawing on both to strengthen their case.