Former top officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — the US agency that tracks and fights disease outbreaks — are warning that the United States is not prepared for the next pandemic. Staff cuts, empty leadership roles, and reduced funding have weakened the agency's ability to detect and respond to infectious diseases.

Dan Jernigan, who used to lead the CDC's center for emerging infectious diseases, told The Guardian on July 22, 2026: "Are we ready for the next big pandemic? My answer is no." Debra Houry, the CDC's former chief medical officer, was equally direct: "Unfortunately, we're really moving in the wrong direction" The Guardian.

The scale of the disruption is large. About 80% of the CDC's senior leadership positions still have no permanent people appointed to them. Between 25% and 30% of the agency's entire staff are gone The Guardian. These reductions follow workforce changes that began in early 2025, when former CDC official David Fleming warned that CDC firings would have ripple effects on US infectious disease and pandemic preparedness NPR.

Specific divisions have been hit hard. The CDC lost around $40 million in funding to fight malaria and neglected tropical diseases after the Trump administration dismantled USAID, the federal agency that handles international development and global health aid. Of the 73 employees in the malaria and neglected tropical diseases divisions, 35 were laid off after that funding loss. The CDC's cyclospora laboratory, which tracks a parasite spread through contaminated food that causes intestinal illness, fell from 11 people to three staff members. Millions in funding for mRNA vaccines, described as important for fighting the next pandemic, has also been cut The Guardian.

The cuts have also affected disease monitoring programs outside the CDC's main headquarters. Erik Svendsen, the fired former director of a CDC division, was referenced in AP reporting on CDC cuts affecting cruise ship disease outbreak monitoring. Four full-time CDC staff, including scientists, were dismissed from the division Svendsen formerly led AP.

The warnings from former officials line up with real disease trends. The US surpassed the previous year's measles cases as of July 2026. More than half of US states have passed laws limiting what public health officials can do during emergencies, making it harder for state and local health departments to respond when outbreaks occur The Guardian. The Alaska Beacon reported on July 6, 2026, that a former CDC director warned the US is vulnerable to the return of infectious diseases following Trump administration health program cuts Alaska Beacon.

The broader context here is one of compounding vulnerabilities. Think of disease surveillance like a network of smoke detectors in a large building. When you remove sensors and staff, you have fewer alarms going off, and the ones that remain have to cover more ground. The loss of the cyclospora team from eleven to three means fewer people watching for foodborne outbreaks at a time when cases are not declining. The elimination of 35 of 73 positions in the malaria and tropical diseases divisions removes experienced staff whose knowledge does not rebuild quickly, even if funding returns. And the $40 million loss tied to USAID's dismantlement cuts a funding line that connected US disease monitoring to global tracking, a connection that public health officials have long said is essential because diseases do not respect borders.

The leadership vacuum adds to the staffing losses. With roughly four in five senior leadership positions unfilled on a permanent basis, the CDC faces questions about who makes decisions and whether those decisions can continue smoothly during an active outbreak. At the same time, state-level laws restricting public health emergency powers in more than half of US states mean that even where federal capacity exists, state and local officials may have less authority to act than they did during the COVID-19 pandemic.

What is not yet clear is whether these reductions are a permanent restructuring of the US public health system or a temporary pullback that could be reversed under different political conditions. The officials sounding the alarm, Jernigan and Houry among them, are doing so from outside the agency, their former positions now either vacant or filled temporarily. Their assessments carry the weight of years of experience but no current authority inside the agency. The trajectory they describe, in their own words, is one of deterioration rather than stabilization.