On July 22, 2026, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to work together on peaceful nuclear power for the next 30 years. Under the deal, U.S. companies will build Saudi Arabia's nuclear energy program. President Trump approved the deal and will ask Congress to sign off on it. The agreement could also allow uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. The U.S. Department of Energy published the announcement, which followed a formal declaration signed by the U.S. Energy Secretary and Saudi Arabia's Energy Minister.

The agreement covers a multi-billion-dollar partnership lasting decades. U.S. companies will construct and supply Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure, including programs for nuclear safety, security, and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The National Nuclear Security Administration took part in the negotiations. A separate agreement between the two governments on cooperation in nuclear energy and other energy sectors had been established earlier.

The most important parts of the deal involve what is called the nuclear fuel cycle. This is the chain of steps to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. One key step is uranium enrichment, which means increasing the concentration of a material in uranium so it can power a reactor. The agreement creates a legal pathway for this work to happen inside Saudi Arabia, while aiming to prevent enrichment to weapons-grade levels — the much higher concentration needed for a nuclear bomb. The deal includes a waiver for inspections. It also leaves out a protocol for oversight by the IAEA, or International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the world's nuclear watchdog responsible for making sure nuclear materials are used peacefully. As Reuters reported, this means the deal's safety rules depend on agreements between the two countries rather than the stronger, independent inspections the IAEA normally conducts.

The enrichment question has been the main point of disagreement in U.S.-Saudi nuclear talks for years. Saudi Arabia has insisted it has the right to enrich uranium on its own soil. U.S. lawmakers and groups that work to stop the spread of nuclear weapons have pushed to ban enrichment entirely in deals like this one. The fact that this agreement allows a pathway to enrichment, even if limited, breaks from what the United States has historically demanded from countries in the region. Leaving out the IAEA oversight protocol adds to those concerns, because it is not clear from public information how the rules would be enforced.

The broader context here is the regional nuclear landscape. Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions have long been watched closely because of Iran's own uranium enrichment program in the same region. By giving Saudi Arabia a legal route to enrichment without mandatory IAEA oversight, the deal could make it harder to keep a shared commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. Congress will now formally review the agreement. Under U.S. law, Congress has a set period of time to examine the deal and can reject it. Whether enough lawmakers will vote to block it will determine if the agreement goes forward as written.

The deal's language aims to stop enrichment at weapons-grade levels, but without IAEA monitoring, it is unclear how that limit would be enforced. The inspection waivers could, depending on what they cover, even limit the United States' own ability to check that Saudi Arabia is following the rules. The details of those waivers — what they include, what they leave out, and what takes their place — will be examined during the Congressional review period.

What the deal does, in practical terms, is open Saudi Arabia's nuclear energy market to American companies. In exchange, it accepts that Saudi Arabia will enrich uranium, rather than treating that as a hard line that cannot be crossed. The trade-off — business opportunities for a weaker system of nuclear safeguards — is what Congress will now weigh. The stakes go beyond the two countries involved. Whatever precedent this sets for how much enrichment is tolerated and how inspections are handled will shape how other countries seeking nuclear technology negotiate their own deals.